EUROPEAN CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES: *BRIDGING THE RESOURCES GAP?*

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Abstract

Civilian operations as part of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – often referred to as civilian crisis management (CCM) in contrast to military operations – have become a key instrument of European foreign policy. They range from police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civil administration, and civil protection (outlined in the Feira European Council, June 2000) to various types of monitoring missions and support to EU Special Representatives (added in the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, December 2004). Civilian crisis management ties in closely with European values, discourse and norms arguably giving the EU a comparative advantage over actors such as NATO as a military alliance or the United Nations with a more diverse membership and the mandate to direct large-scale military peacekeeping operations as well as interim administrations and peace building missions, often containing civilian and police components. Two-thirds of EU CSDP operations were civilian or had civilian components (18 of 24). In addition, the demand for civilian crisis management has been growing since the 1990s and keeps rising. The European Common Security and Defence Policy is, in practice, largely driven by the need for civilian crisis management.

GGI Briefing Paper 2/2011

Introduction

EU and member states need to increase their focus on civilian capacities considerably to close the "deployment gap" of 27 percent positions the operations unfilled (European Council 2010).

Based on the demand, EU member states pledged 10,000 civilian personnel on 22 November 2004. However, as Grevi et al. report with about 2,300 civilian personnel deployed in 2009 the EU was at its limit (2009:415). EU member states therefore need to step up their efforts of registering, training and supplying civilian personnel. This is particularly timely, as the second Civilian Headline Goal, set out on 19 November 2007 to improve European civilian crisis management (CCM) capabilities, has ended in 2010.

Civilian crisis management deserves more attention for two reasons: Firstly, the demand for civilian engagement in crises and conflicts has grown significantly since the 1990s and continues to rise. It enables the EU to manage the transition between crisis management and longer-term stabilisation and development. Secondly, this in turn strengthens the role of the EU in international affairs and its focus on a comprehensive approach, linking civil and military means. CCM tasks were outlined in June 2000 at the Feira European Council to establish 'civilian crisis management' with four priority areas: Police, strengthening the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection (Feira European Council 2000).

The European Union aims to present itself as an entity that takes values and norms seriously. Civilian operations reinforce the rule of law, democracy and human rights. It therefore embodies European values and links to the European Security Strategy of 2003; promoting peace and stability, the rule of law, democracy, human rights and multilateralism (European Union 2003). In other words, the EU is not aspiring to be a traditional military power, but is driven by values and acting 'as a credible force for good' (Solana 2007).

Civilian crisis management is in high demand

One important signpost of the importance attached to civilian involvement in peace operations is the inclusion into NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept outlining, 'that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management' (NATO 2010b).

Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations grew in number, scope, and size. Although peacekeeping is not mentioned in the United Nations Charter, it became the Organizations' primary function in the domain of peace and security. Richard Caplan argues that the responsibility and power peacekeeping operations have assumed in the last years is 'unprecedented in recent history' (Caplan 2005:1).

Peacekeeping, Conflict Management and Crisis Management are today's key tasks in international security. Only two UN peacekeeping operations existed in 1948/49. At the end of the 1990s, the UN deployed over 10,000 troops, 40,000 by 2001 and while currently 16 peacekeeping missions with over 100,000 people are deployed by the United Nations, about 30% of which are civilians and police forces (UN 2010). In addition, NATO commands over 130,000 troops in Afghanistan (NATO 2010a). The contribution of the EU is considerably smaller, only 14,000 troops and 2.300 civilian personnel are under European Union command (Grevi et al. 2009:414).

While modern armies can disrupt any given regime within a matter of days they need the civilian side to re-establish order and trust and ensuring the acceptance of the monopoly of violence by the population and contesting factions. The European Security Strategy affirms: 'civilian crisis management helps restore civil government'.

Along with the growth in number and size, the scope of conflict resolution has also grown, from observing peace agreements to disarming and demobilizing armed forces, performing electoral assistance, training police forces, re-establishing a justice system and finally to full administration- and state-building. A consequence is the diverse and rising demand for personnel carrying out civilian crisis management.

As a consequence police forces for example are deployed in much larger numbers than they were previously. Lutterbeck notes that 'while in 1988 a total of only 35 police officers were involved in international peace support operations, by the late-1990s their numbers had multiplied several hundredfold: 1,555 police officers served in Namibia, 3,600 in Cambodia, 900 in Haiti, 1,000

in Mozambique, 1,800 in Bosnia, and more than 6,000 are currently active in Kosovo and East Timor' (Lutterbeck 2005:237).

This was recognized in 2004, when the EU agreed on the first of the two Civilian Headline Goals. Consequently, the expectations of European engagement are rising in Europe and abroad. A study by RAND outlines 'as the United States assesses and develops its own civilian capabilities, it will be important to understand what the EU is capable of doing in this area' to search for complementarities and to be able to rely on the EU (Chivis 2010:iii). If the EU fails to satisfy the promises it set itself with the Civilian Headline Goals it will miss the expectations of its international partners and its recognition as an actor in crisis situations will be hurt significantly.

The success of civilian crisis management depends on supplying civilian capabilities

Member states are unable to provide sufficient civilian personnel for civilian operations. The Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt explains why:

Although the military missions are often seen as the most demanding, it is often the deployment of the more political and civilian ones that are the most challenging. While we have standing military units ready to go– notable the two EU Battle groups ready to deploy within 10 days–we don't have policemen, judges, lawyers or different instructors ready in the same way. But while state-building is about security, it is even more about the building of the different institutions of a functioning society' (Bildt 2008).

Two reasons determine the lack of civilian personnel. One is that member states have spent more time and resources on the military rather than the civil creating almost a sense of path dependency. The second is that in terms of institutional development, institutions for CCM had to be established almost from scratch at the European and national level. They have tended, too, to focus on providing quality but not the quantity of civilian personnel required. In particular the rules, regulations and institutions for registering, training and then deploying civilian personnel were developed too late and even now do not exist in all countries.

In 2004, five years after the establishment of civilian crisis management as part of ESDP and one year after the first civilian operation was mandated, the EU started with an ambitious move forward. Of 1,6 million civilian personnel available in EU member states (Gya 2009), 10,000 civilian personnel were pledged for CCM at the Civilian Capabilities Commitment conference: 5,761 for police, 631 for rule of law, 562 for civilian administration and 4,998 for civil protection (European Council 2004). With the estimated 2.334 civilian personnel deployed (Grevi et al. 2009:415) of which most people are based in the EULEX operation in Kosovo, the EU is, according to officials of the Council and member states, at the limit of its capacity[1].

**EU Deployment to civilian operations, 2003-2010**

Figure 1 Source: Author's own compilation, based on SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database.

Member states are facing two problems in creating civilian capabilities. Figure 1 shows the increase in civilian deployments since the first operation in 2003. With about 1,900 civilian personnel committed since 2008, EULEX Kosovo is clearly tying up most of the EU's civilian capacity. On the one hand, member states and the EU have to ensure that deployed personnel are sufficiently trained. For this purpose, 21 member states have now nominated national training institutions or NGO training providers (European Group on Training (EGT) 2010). But progress is too slow and differs enormously from country to country. In particular, the bigger member states are not providing sufficient personnel. European training institutions, such as the European Police College or European Security and Defence College (both established 2005) exist as well, but they are inward looking and focus on training senior police officers, civil servants, diplomats or military personnel to improve working together internally, but not for deployment in the field.

No detailed European framework or standard for training institutions exists yet. Furthermore, 'centralized national rosters of personnel for

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[1] Author's Interview with officials from Council, Commission and member states in Brussels, 2009

civilian crisis management exist in a small minority of Member States only' (European Council 2009). Based on a conference report by the IAI in Rome, Italy did not even have a software environment to register people on a database. They were offered the programme developed for the German training centre, the Centre for International Peace Operations (Miranda 2009). Such cooperation efforts are, nonetheless, sporadic. In addition, many more people are trained than take up a position afterwards, which means a considerable loss of potential candidates and resources. In particular the large member states do not provide sufficient personnel for their size. While small, and in particular the Nordic countries, supply generous numbers of civilian personnel, France, Germany and the UK have among the lowest ratio of deployed personnel per population. In addition, the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) initiative by France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Spain for military trained police forces is plagued by political constraints.

Recommendations

Member state	Pop. in Mio.	Pers. Deployed	Deployed Pers./ Pop.
Finland	5,26	124	**23,57**
France	64	275	*4,30*
Germany	82,28	259	*3,15*
Romania	22,18	230	**10,37**
Sweden	9,07	143	**15,77**
UK	61,28	125	*2,04*
∑	491,397	2334	
(Based on Grevi et al. 2009: 415)			

The Global Governance Institute recommends that member states and the EU step up their efforts to provide civilian capacities. In order to move forward, the EU needs to define its niche with a European civilian crisis management strategy paper. This should be declared at heads of state level at the next European summit to re-establish political momentum.

Member states, in their turn need to develop a national civilian crisis management strategy, similar to their national security strategy. A good example to follow is Finland with its national strategy (Government of Finland 2008). In addition member states need to meet the 2004 target of the Civilian Headline Goal. Ideally, the process includes benchmarks with clear targets for individual member states to supply the pledged 10,000 civilian capacities.

It is also necessary to better pool national resources at the European level. A European roster for potential candidates is recommended, as well as harmonized national training plans. Participation in trainings by any European country is an important step to establish an esprit de corps for civilian personnel. In addition the budget for civilian crisis management needs to be increased. The Global Governance Institutes suggests creating stronger career incentives for national officials to participate in operations abroad.

Furthermore, options need to be explored to strengthen or adapt the EGF initiative. It is so far plagued by the divisions between those EU member states that have a culture of military police forces and those EU member states that strictly separate military from police forces for historical reasons (such as Germany). As a result, EU-wide agreement on deploying the EGF for humanitarian tasks was almost impossible to achieve. This was most recently highlighted by the failure to reach agreement on an EGF deployment during the humanitarian crisis in Haiti in January 2010.

The aspect of learning from each other in adopting innovative and progressive solutions should be enhanced via regular working group meetings at technical level. A designated institute, such as the EUISS or a national training centre should be established as a central hub and offer expertise and advise on incorporating feedback from the first operations deployed. States ought to work more closely with NGOs and civil society for operational planning and staffing, instead of keeping the national monopoly on selecting and seconding personnel.

Last but not least, the bigger countries in the EU, in particular Germany, France and the UK, should bear an equally high burden than the smaller Nordic states to enable the EU to deploy more personnel and become an effective and well recognized actor in crisis management.

Finally, the prospect of NATO entering the field of civilian crisis management and policing entails both vast opportunities and risks. European governments need to ensure full complementarity and mutual reinforcement between both NATO and the EU in order to avoid yet another instance of EU-NATO friction.

About the Author

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