



GLOBAL  
GOVERNANCE  
INSTITUTE

---

**From a Militarized to a Humanized  
“Responsibility to Protect”: Integrating  
the Red Cross and Red Crescent into RtoP  
to Respond to Natural Disasters and  
Global Climate Change**

---

Ziggy Vandebriel  
zvandebriel@globalgovernance.eu

**GGI Analysis Paper 2013**

---

June 2013

The Global Governance Institute  
Pleinlaan 5,  
1050 Brussels, Belgium  
Email: [info@globalgovernance.eu](mailto:info@globalgovernance.eu)  
Web: [www.globalgovernance.eu](http://www.globalgovernance.eu)

## Abstract

In recent years the frequency and intensity of natural and environmental catastrophes has risen sharply and is expected to continue to worsen over time due to global climate change. Accordingly our world now faces increasingly significant losses of lives, livelihoods, and cultural and natural heritage due to these disasters. The Global Governance Institute feels that it is incumbent upon world governments and the international community to design and implement efficient and effective frameworks to address these issues, and with this paper, we suggest that the international Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) framework serve as a starting point. In this paper, we explore how previous attempts to incorporate natural disasters could potentially be overcome by demilitarizing the RtoP response to natural disasters through the use of an expanded and empowered International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). The IFRC is a neutral and experienced non-military, humanitarian organization, and as such, would address concerned UN Member States' unease over outside interventions on their territory. The paper also serves as a call to begin a discussion within and between the climate change and peace and security communities on both the increasingly important topic of disaster relief, as well as on shifting the discourse on security away from the reactionary politics of military-based security and towards action aimed at the root causes of much violent conflict, a lack of human security.

## Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations .....	4
1. Introduction .....	5
2. RtoP at Glance.....	7
3. Pushing the Boundaries: Climate Change, Security, and the Lack of an International Framework .....	9
4. Building Bridges: RtoP as a Catalyst for Natural Disaster Relief .....	10
4a. Scope Extension .....	11
4b. Proposed organizational structure: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as implementing agent.....	11
4c. Challenges for a Scope Extension.....	12
5. Conclusion.....	13
Bibliography: .....	15
Annex: Legal Principles for Humanitarian Intervention and basic principles for RtoP .....	18
About the Author .....	19
About the Global Governance Institute .....	19

## List of Abbreviations

EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
P-5	The five UN Member States with veto power in the UNSC (China, UK, USA, France and Russia)
RtoP	Responsibility to Protect
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNISDR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
UNSD	United Nations Statistical Division
WHO	World Health Organization

# 1. Introduction

At the United Nation's (UN) World Summit of 2005, Member States committed themselves to the 'Responsibility to Protect', a new humanitarian norm in international security. The aim was not only to commit Member States to take responsibility for protecting their citizens against atrocities but also to assure that the international community is empowered to assist and intervene should a state fail to grant this protection. As the 21<sup>st</sup> century marches forward however, it has been increasingly recognized that many issues other than the threat of violence are integral to ensuring adequate human security, for instance climate change and environmental degradation more broadly. Despite rapid and violent increases in extreme weather events and natural disasters over the past decade, to date no comprehensive strategy for the security implications of climate change has been put forth. This paper is a call to begin this discussion, as well as to shift the discourse on human security away from the reactionary politics of conflict and towards proactive action aimed at the root causes of violent conflict.

According to the 2012 Special Report on Natural Disasters by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the recently observed trend in increasing frequency, and intensity, of extreme weather events is set to continue as climate change continues to quicken its pace in coming years (IPCC 2012 & EM-DAT, 2012) (see figure 1 on following page). In 2010, the death toll directly related to natural disasters surpassed 300,000 (EM-DAT, 2012), the deadliest year to date, whilst the number of people directly affected by such disasters is expected to rise significantly in years to come (see figure 2 on following page). Not only do these disasters cause significant loss of human life, they also have serious economic, cultural and social implications for millions of people left to deal with the aftermath of a disaster. Munich Re claims that the natural disasters of 2011 generated a record cost of about US \$378 billion (Economist, 2012).

Although this data also includes natural disasters with no direct connection to climate change, e.g. earthquakes, they clearly indicate that many countries lack the necessary means at the economic, political and civil level to effectively protect their citizens from the disastrous effects of natural disasters which climate change is already amplifying at an alarming rate. Furthermore, some governments have proven unwilling to accept international disaster relief assistance, for example Burma when it was ravished by cyclone Nargis in 2008. Although official numbers were never released, it is estimated that the cyclone caused about 140,000 casualties, making Nargis one of the most disastrous cyclones in South-East Asia since 1991 (Shah, 2005). These developments challenge the international community to consider important questions surrounding the norm of RtoP:

- Do states have a responsibility to protect their citizens against the adverse effects of natural disasters?
- When states appear unable or unwilling to offer such protection, to what extent does the international community have a responsibility for assistance and relief in the aftermath of natural disasters?

Natural disasters reported 1900 - 2011




Figure 1: EM-DAT. Natural Disasters Reported 1900 – 2011.

Number of people reported affected by natural disasters 1975 - 2011




Figure 2: EM-DAT. Number of People Reported Affected by Natural Disasters 1900 – 2011.

To begin the discussion on these issues, the Global Governance Institute argues for the expansion of RtoP's scope to natural disasters. The paper does so by examining the norms and values of RtoP and concludes that, if RtoP is to be taken seriously, it must be reformed. The analysis looks at the opportunities and challenges that would arise with this scope revision, in particular with regards to the organizational structure of RtoP. The paper begins by offering a brief background of RtoP, including the discussions and controversies that emerged during the formation of the norm. In the second section, the issue of climate change and its security implications are examined, as well as the institutional frameworks in place at the international level to address security threats associated with climate change. In the final section, the paper explores the possibility of extending RtoP's scope to include natural and environmental catastrophes. In addition, it discusses the reforms needed at the organizational level in order to effectively address the security implications coming with natural environmental catastrophes.

## 2. RtoP at Glance

RtoP was designed to prevent and halt atrocities such as those that took place in Rwanda in 1994, Kosovo in 1999, among other places. The “responsibility” referred to in RtoP has three components (Luck, 2008):

1. The responsibility of individual states to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing;
2. The responsibility of the international community to assist states in fulfilling this responsibility;
3. The responsibility of the international community to use appropriate means to protect civilians when their government is unable or unwilling to do so.

RtoP is a norm rather than a legally enforceable tool, and its success rests upon the principle of solidarity among states to pool their strengths when needed and requested by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to safeguard civilians. The incapability of the international community to act in a decisive and effective manner during the Balkan Wars, Rwandan Genocide and the Kosovo Crisis, as well as the humanitarian action taken in Kosovo without UNSC approval, formed the backdrop against which RtoP was developed.

Based on the idea that state sovereignty is a responsibility, the RtoP norm legitimates an intervention in sovereign states should they fail to protect their citizens from the crimes considered under RtoP<sup>1</sup>. Nevertheless, before the UNSC can request an intervention under RtoP, the six principles that determine the basis for intervention as well as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) criteria for legitimate intervention must be fulfilled. These are outlined in the Annex on page 18.

In the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo bombings, UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Kofi Anan posed the idea of establishing a fast and efficient tool to combat atrocities, which he called upon the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to develop (Zifcak, 2010). Two years later, in response to Annan's demand, the ICISS presented its report, entitled: ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (ICISS, 2001). The report challenged the conception of humanitarian intervention as it had been perceived of to date, and argued for the first time that a responsibility to prevent atrocities exists, and that governments must ensure both good governance as well as basic

---

<sup>1</sup> These crimes are: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. (UN World Summit Outcome, 2005)

human needs<sup>2</sup> to civilians. Secondly, the report argued that the international community has a responsibility to intervene should states fail to provide these basic services to their citizens. It was emphasized that any initial reaction should not use force, but rather economic sanctions and/or diplomatic negotiations were encouraged. Lastly, it stated that after an intervention under RtoP takes place, the international community has a responsibility to provide assistance in rebuilding the state in order to avoid a new outbreak of violence and secure civilians (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2008).

The original report also proposed an extended definition of security, including diseases, hunger, environmental hazards, crime etc. (ICISS, 2001). The ICISS additionally urged the UNGA to include a fourth responsibility which did not, in the end, survive the negotiation process, namely that the Member States would have a responsibility to protect civilians in the case of “Overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened” (ICISS, 2001: 31). Edward Luck (Former Special advisor to the UNSG on RtoP) has pointed out that the main reason for this reduction in scope was the concern of many non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries that adding an environmental component would grant a blank check for interventions to countries with UNSC veto power (sometimes called the P-5 countries) (Luck, 2008:4).

The final outcome, decided at the 2005 World Summit of the UN was considered disappointing by many proponents of an extended security concept, who referred to the outcome as ‘RtoP lite’ (Luck, 2008:4). Nevertheless, even the current three-pillar RtoP marked a substantial step in international relations and international governance, changing how international community viewed the role of the state, humanitarian interventions, and the garnering of political consent for such an intervention.

The Burmese government’s refusal to accept international assistance in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis gave momentum to proponents of extending RtoP to natural disasters and climate change. Edward Luck tried to advocate an extended RtoP scope again in 2009, although he chose not to push for the ultimate scope as described in the ICISS report. This time he carefully picked core issues that were very present at the international stage. In his view, the protection from counter-terrorism, climate change, and natural disasters were most pressing and in need of effective response through RtoP (Zifcak, 2010: 519). Despite his efforts and specific focus on core issues, his proposal received little support from the UNSC and the UNGA, with particular resistance from Russia and China, who were fearful that invoking RtoP for the Cyclone would set a precedent for future missions in their own countries.

Looking at recent developments in the field of climate change and security however, it seems that the question is moving back to the agenda. Recent research has reinforced the usage of broad definitions of human security that includes climate change as an element of this concept (Hsiang, 2011: 438-441).

Despite recent disagreements over the Libya intervention which spread scepticism on the efficacy of an expanded RtoP, with the intensity and frequency of natural disasters as well as the costs of climate change increasing, the Global Governance Institute feels an expansion of RtoP has a better chance of success today than in the past. We feel its chances for success

---

<sup>2</sup> Basic human needs, according to the UN, include food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information (World Summit for Social Development Programme of Action, 1995).



would be increased further if RtoP expansion could be undertaken in a way that would eliminate concerns over foreign military presence on domestic soil, as we suggest in Section 4 of this paper.

### **3. Pushing the Boundaries: Climate Change, Security, and the Lack of an International Framework**

Among practitioners and academia there has been consensus for years that climate change poses a severe threat to human security (Brauch, 2005; IPCC, 2012). Natural disasters linked with climate change (i.e. climatic events such as floods, droughts and storms; wildfires; insect infestations; and some epidemics) demonstrate this link between climate change and security most clearly and often violently. As the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has stated: “With growing population and infrastructure development, human exposure to natural hazards is inevitably increasing. This is particularly true as the strongest population growth is located in coastal areas with greater exposure to floods, cyclones, and high tidal surges” (UNEP, 2009:27). Figure 1 (page 6) demonstrates the significant increase in the number of natural hazards over the last 35 years, with frequencies and intensities set to increase further as the affects of climate change progress further in coming years.

The impacts of natural disasters have both direct and indirect security implications, which include access to food and water, migration flows due to land loss and degradation or drought, damaged infrastructure, and disrupted economic activities (IPCC, 2012; CNA Corporation, 2007). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), climate change has been affecting four facets of food security for years already: food availability, food accessibility, food utilization, and food systems stability (FAO, 2009). More specifically, the extreme weather events currently increasing in both severity and frequency, such as droughts, floods, cyclones etc. will increase crop failures and lead to food emergencies (FAO, 2009). In a recent paper, S. Alam and M.S. Karim claim that particularly in the least developed countries, such pressure on primary resources will directly lead to mass migration to urban areas, with profound impacts on the ability of cities to cope with these new burdens (Alam and Karim, 2011). In terms of the impact on health, the World Health Organization (WHO) expects increases in extreme weather events will contribute to an increase in respiratory diseases, and that possible shortages in fresh water due to variable rainfall and floods will contaminate the fresh water supplies and increase the risk of water-borne diseases (diarrhoea, cholera, etc.) (WHO, 2010).

Numerous examples over the last decade demonstrate that extreme weather events affect both industrialized and developing countries, with both immediate and gradual negative consequences. One example of such gradual process is the drought of 2010-2011 on the Horn of Africa that led to numerous failed harvests. As a consequence, food prices rose dramatically, leaving thousands of people hungry and forcing them to leave as environmental refugees, putting stress on neighbouring countries such as Kenya which took on approximately 350,000 starving refugees. On the other hand, an example of a rapid shock is the Thai flooding of 2011 in the aftermath of heavy monsoons. The flood affected several large cities including Bangkok and flooded two thirds of the country over the course of four months. As a consequence of the flood, hospitals were made dysfunctional, making it very hard to treat the thousands of victims of this disaster.

In recent years, these and other numerous natural disasters have indicated the need for an international mechanism to address the security implications of climate change and natural

disasters outlined above. Such a mechanism would benefit countries that lack the practical or economic abilities to deal with such events and can force relief or aid upon a government in cases where it is refused. In the case of cyclone Nargis in 2008, which completely ravished large swathes of the Burmese countryside and population, the Military Junta refused all UN aid and foreign relief offered, leading the French Ambassador to UN, Jean-Maurice Ripert, to call this refusal a crime against humanity (Özerdem, 2010). Indeed, this event was a catalyzing moment in the quest to invoke RtoP in the case of a natural disaster. Although support for such action came from many directions, including notably from the French Government, Member of the European Parliament Anna Gomes and ICISS founder Lloyd Axworthy, these proponents were unable to galvanize the international community to act on the grounds of RtoP (Özerdem, 2010). Again, the justification of dissenting countries was to avoid setting precedents that could be used against them in the future.

Adding an environmental pillar to RtoP could also benefit wealthier countries, as recent examples demonstrate that industrial countries are not shielded against the adverse effects of extreme weather events, either. For instance, the United States faced the deadly consequences of a natural disaster in 2005 when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, leaving 1,836 dead and emergency response units overwhelmed. Similarly, Australia was struck by major floods in 2010-2011, affecting over 200,000 people.

Disasters such as these demonstrate that regardless of their level of economic development, countries often lack the means to deal with the often unexpected and monumentally large effects of natural disasters. Currently, countries often show solidarity with one another by providing technical and financial relief to affected areas. However, in the long run, sustainable efforts to rebuild and increase the resilience of affected areas are lacking. Therefore, the Global Governance Institute finds an efficient international framework to address the adverse humanitarian effects of natural disasters is necessary.

Existing efforts, such as the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) Hyogo Framework for Action only focus on the reduction of natural disasters rather than reducing casualties as a result of the adverse effects of natural disasters, and as such, are limited in scope and effectiveness (UNISDR, 2005). Moreover, it seems that the Hyogo Framework has not effectively contributed to limiting the adverse effects of natural disasters to date. According to Munich Re, seven out of the ten costliest disasters in human history have occurred since 2005, the year in which the Hyogo Framework came into force (Munich Re, 2012).

The Global Governance Institute believes an efficient framework is one that addresses the adverse effects of natural disasters by providing a coherent and effective international structure for disaster relief efforts. Some regional international organizations such as the EU are already pioneering similar frameworks for their member states. The European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) is the EU's framework to assist states in times of major national disasters, intervening in cases of natural disasters to offer relief for civilians (EU, 2011). It allows for reliable, fast, and most importantly, sustainable disaster relief that outlasts media and governmental attention spans.

#### **4. Building Bridges: RtoP as a Catalyst for Natural Disaster Relief**

The Global Governance Institute argues that RtoP presents a promising opportunity to develop a coherent and norm-based international framework for disaster relief. This argumentation is built upon three main points: 1) RtoP is the only humanitarian principle to date that can be imposed on a country (by the international community) with the aim of guaranteeing the protection of civilians during atrocities; 2) RtoP can be invoked by the UNSC – or the UNGA through the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution<sup>3</sup>– within a reasonable timeframe; and 3) there is a wide basis of support (UN Member States, NGOs, and academia) in favour of expanding RtoP to include disaster relief. In the following, changes necessary to enable such an expansion of RtoP will be explored including legal wording, organizational roles, structures and other practicalities. Finally, insights into overcoming past challenges for scope extension are given.

#### **4a. Scope Extension**

Whilst we suggest the three pillar concept of RtoP remain unchanged, expanding the scope of RtoP to include natural disasters would entail the careful wording of a new ‘responsibility’. The Global Governance Institute feels the most appropriate wording would be based on the original ICISS phrasing noted above, but adapted slightly to the following:

*The responsibility of the international community to aid in overcoming overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened.*

The implementation of this scope extension would have to pass through the UNGA and with a two-thirds majority. While debates on this issue have been held unsuccessfully in the past (see Ford 2010 for an analysis of the debate surrounding cyclone Nargis) there is currently a reasonable expectation that more countries today are open to a scope extension than was previously the case. For instance, in recent years, the voices of small island states (SIDS) have become louder in the climate change debate, specifically because these countries are all facing urgent and potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change (UN, 2011). In addition, larger countries are also increasingly facing human security implications from climate change (e.g. the “superstorm” Hurricane Sandy in the USA) and may be more open to negotiations on the issue than in the past. Lastly, the costs of natural disasters are putting more pressure on countries to take serious action, including those originally opposing an RtoP extension (Government of Mexico and World Bank, 2012).

#### **4b. Proposed organizational structure: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as implementing agent**

The UN Charter outlines that the UNSC’s primary task is to maintain international peace and security (Article 24), and as such a mandate for RtoP during natural and environmental disasters could be granted under Articles 39-42 of the Charter. However, in order to enact such a mandate, the 20<sup>th</sup> century conception of maintaining international peace and security will have to be updated to encompass natural disasters. While in principle, reforming RtoP to include natural and environmental disasters would not necessitate any major impact on the structure or functionality of RtoP, the Global Governance Institute does suggest a departure

---

<sup>3</sup> The Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950 allows the UNGA to make recommendations on international peace and security when the UNSC fails to do so. In other words, the UNGA has the power to heavily pressure the UNSC to push through decisions and avoid selectiveness. This resolution was passed in the midst of the Cold War, when the UNSC faced a number of deadlocks. To date, Uniting for Peace has only been used ten times (Weis and Daws, 2008).

from the current structure in order to overcome the political and practical challenges associated with expanding the scope of RtoP.

In particular the Global Governance Institute suggests the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) be the primary implementing organization for relief operations under RtoP in the aftermath of natural disasters. Although significant capacity and resource expansion would be required of the IFRC to do so, the same would be true of any organisation tapped to take on such a role. In addition to its decades of global humanitarian aid work, the IFRC is entitled to execute its work under Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention for which the prerequisite is strict impartiality and neutrality. In addition, virtually every country has approved of the IFRC by signing to the Geneva Conventions, where the status of the IFRC as well as its neutrality is assured. The IFRC can execute fieldwork for wounded or sick civilians and can usually operate without restrictions from host governments, an aspect which would be key to its success as an RtoP implementing body. An obvious challenge for the IFRC would be the ability to provide global relief, which will be touched upon in the next subsection.

The Global Governance Institute suggests RtoP in cases of disaster function nearly identically to RtoP concerning conflicts in that it would only be implemented if an affected country is unwilling or unable to protect its civilians from adverse effects of an overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophe. If it is unable to protect its citizens, the affected country would have the responsibility to call upon the international community (i.e. UNSC) for assistance. If it is unwilling to protect its citizens, the UNSC would be responsible for mandating the IFRC to carry out a relief operation and ensure with adequate legal protection for IFRC staff. The IFRC's task would solely be to execute its humanitarian mandate in the affected country. In terms of the operational capacities, it is suggested that the responsibility to provide the equipment and other resources needed to execute relief missions be executed through a 'pooling and sharing' framework similar to those within the EU and NATO. Such a flexible system would allow UN Member States to either put equipment and personnel needed at the disposal of the IFRC on a case to case basis (as is done with peacekeeping missions) or loan out equipment for longer periods of time.

Finally, the UNGA would be responsible for both assisting the UNSC and Member States in tracking cases in which the international community needs to step in, as well as reminding the UNSC of its responsibility to protect when in deadlock.

#### **4c. Challenges for a Scope Extension**

Defining what an "overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophe" is precisely will certainly be a point of contention in discussions over operationalising a disaster-focused RtoP clause. One suggestion for this definition would be: A natural event or force brought forth by a natural or anthropogenic cycle with overwhelming or catastrophic consequences, leading to loss of life, displacement, human, economic and infrastructural damage, and potentially inflicting long-term humanitarian crises. Examples would include: earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, and other geological processes.

Defining "unable or unwilling" to protect one's citizens will also likely be contentious. Within the current framework of RtoP, the latter is already a major point of discussion. The Global Governance Institute suggests that if no governmental relief is offered to victims, or the intention to do so is not projected within the first 1–3 days after a catastrophic natural disaster and/or international relief efforts are denied, the respective government can be judged unable or unwilling to protect its civilians by the UNSC. More specifically, if a

country calls upon the international community for help, it should be judged unable to protect.

The issue of equipment supply could also become contentious in discussions over scope extension. Thanks to its decades of experience, the IFRC already has a significant amount of equipment at its disposal including planes, helicopters, boats, medical equipment, food etc. Nevertheless, in order to ensure the readiness of personnel and equipment at a moments notice, expansion of funding for personnel and equipment for the IFRC will be needed, but would not necessarily be overly burdensome if adequate ‘pooling and sharing’ was undertaken.

## 5. Conclusion

Our world is faced with increasingly significant losses of lives, livelihoods, and cultural and natural heritage due to an upswing in the frequency and intensity of natural and environmental catastrophes, brought on in part by climate change. It is incumbent upon governments and the international community to design and implement efficient and effective frameworks to address these issues. The Global Governance Institute believes that the international RtoP framework can serve as such a framework if extended to include natural disasters. It would mandate the international community to cooperatively provide disaster relief operations where a state is unable or unwilling to provide such relief operations for its citizens.

Extending the scope of the Responsibility to Protect would offer great opportunities for future relief operations that would result in lives saved. However, political will to do so on the part of many UN Member States is still lacking. This paper has outlined a global relief framework for consideration by UN Member States that may help overcome some of the current political challenges associated with RtoP scope expansion by proposing an organizational structure which sees the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies play the major implementing role. The IFRC’s reputation as a neutral, effective, non-military humanitarian agency is unparalleled, and having its staff involved in humanitarian work would pose no threat with concerns over sovereignty and the international community overstepping its bounds.

Moving forward on this idea, finding the political will needed to agree to include ‘overwhelming natural and environmental catastrophes’ as part of the first level of RtoP will be the greatest challenge facing any scope expansion. For this reason, we recommend that the initiative for this endeavour must come from the UN Secretary-General, who is particularly influential in agenda setting within the UN system. Talks must also be held between the IFRC and the UN on the checks and balances of an RtoP extension – i.e. mandate, expectations, cooperative framework, equipment, personnel etc.

It is precisely because of the increasing attention to climate change and its adverse effects that the Global Governance Institute believes the development of an international framework for disaster relief is a timely issue that needs to be addressed urgently. As efforts to mitigate and adapt to dangerous climate change are progressing slowly at best, it is becoming ever more urgent that the international community act to install a framework capable of adequately responding to intensifying natural disasters and the havoc they wreak on their

millions of innocent victims. We hope this paper can serve as a starting point for a fruitful discussion on ways to move forward in addressing this global challenge.

## Bibliography:

- Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2008): Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect. Myanmar/Burma Briefing Paper, No. 2 May 16, 2008. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: [http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/documents/Burma\\_Brief2.pdf](http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/documents/Burma_Brief2.pdf)
- BBC (2011): Horn of Africa sees worst drought in 60 years. BBC June 28, 2011. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13944550>
- Bellamy, Alex J and Wheeler, Nicholas (ed.) (2011): The Responsibility to Protect and International Law. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Blake, Eric S and Gibney, Ethan J (2011): The Deadliest, costliest and most intense United States tropical cyclones from 1851 to 2010. National Climatic Data Center, National Hurricane Center. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/nws-nhc-6.pdf>
- Bournay, Emmanuelle (2007): In Dead Water - Climate Change, Pollution, Over-harvest, and Invasive Species in the World's Fishing Grounds. UNEP/GRID, Arendal. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: [http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/trends-in-natural-disasters\\_a899](http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/trends-in-natural-disasters_a899)
- Brauch, Hans Günter: Environment and Human Security (2005): Towards Freedom from Hazard Impacts. United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security, Briefing Paper, No.2. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/get/4031>
- CNA Corporation (2007): National Security and the Threat of Climate Change. CNA Security and Climate Change. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://www.cna.org/reports/climate>
- Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention) (1949): Geneva, August 12, 1949. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://www.IFRC.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/375?OpenDocument>
- EM-DATA (2012): Natural Disaster Trends. The International Disaster Database – Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). <http://www.emdat.be/natural-disasters-trends>
- EU (2011): The European Union Solidarity Fund. European Council Regulation No. 2012/2002, June 2011. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/regional\\_policy/provisions\\_and\\_instruments/g24217\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/regional_policy/provisions_and_instruments/g24217_en.htm)
- Evans, Gareth (2008): The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes once and for all. Washington, Brookings Institution.
- FAO (2009): Coping with a changing Climate: Considerations for Adaptation and Mitigation in Agriculture. Rome: Environment and Natural Resource Management Series, No. 15, 2009. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1315e/i1315e.pdf>
- Ford, Stuart (2010): Is the Failure to Respond to a Natural Disaster a Crime Against Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect and the Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Aftermath of Cyclone Nargis. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy Vol.38: 227-277.
- Government of Mexico and the World Bank (2012): Improving the Assessment of Disaster Risks to Strengthen Financial Resilience. September 2012. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: [http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/gfdrr\\_g20\\_high?mode=window&backgroundColor=%23222222](http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/gfdrr_g20_high?mode=window&backgroundColor=%23222222)
- Hsiang S.M Meng K.C and M.A Cane (2011): Civil Conflicts are associated with the global

- climate. *Nature* Vol.476: 438-444. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at:  
<http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v476/n7361/full/nature10311.html>
- ICISS (2001): *The Responsibility to Protect*. Ottawa: International Development Research Center.
- IFRC (2012): *Emergency Items Catalogue*. Vol. 1-3. <http://procurement.ifrc.org/catalogue/>
- IPCC (2012): *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adoption*. IPCC, June 2012. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: [http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-All\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-All_FINAL.pdf)
- International Disaster Database (2011): '2011' disasters in numbers. Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at:  
[http://www.preventionweb.net/files/24697\\_246922011disasterstats1.pdf](http://www.preventionweb.net/files/24697_246922011disasterstats1.pdf)
- Luck Edward C (2008): *The United Nations and The Responsibility to Protect*. The Stanley Foundation, Policy Analysis Brief, August 2008. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at:  
[http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/TSF\\_theUNandR2P.pdf](http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/TSF_theUNandR2P.pdf)
- Mitchell Tom (2012): *Options for Including Disaster Resilience in Post-2015 Development Goals*. Overseas Development Institute, Background Note: September 2012. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7820.pdf>
- Munich RE (2012): *Significant Natural Catastrophes 1980-2011: 10 Costliest Events Worldwide Ordered by Overall Losses*. NatCatService, March 2012. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at:  
[http://www.munichre.com/app\\_pages/www/@res/pdf/NatCatService/significant\\_natural\\_catastrophes/2011/NatCatSERVICE\\_significant\\_eco\\_en.pdf](http://www.munichre.com/app_pages/www/@res/pdf/NatCatService/significant_natural_catastrophes/2011/NatCatSERVICE_significant_eco_en.pdf)
- Özdemir Alpaslan (2010): *The Responsibility to Protect in Natural Disasters: Another Excuse for Interventionism? Nargis Cyclone, Myanmar*. *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol. 10 No. 5: 693-713. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at:  
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2010.511511>
- S. Alam and M.S. Karim (2011): *Linkages of Development and Environment: In search of an Integrated Approach through Sustainable Development*. *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review*, Vol. 23: 345-364. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at:  
<https://articleworks.cadmus.com/geolaw/zsk00311.htm>
- Shah Aup (2005): *Hurricane Katrina. Global Issues: Social, Political, Economic and Environmental Issues that Affect Us All*, November 13, 2005. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://www.globalissues.org/article/564/hurricane-katrina>
- The Economist (2012): *Counting the costs of Calamities*, January 14th 2012. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://www.economist.com/node/21542755>
- United Nations (2011): *Press Conference on Small Island Developing States' Position Ahead of Durban Climate Change Conference*. Department of Public Information: News and Media Division, New York: November 23 2011. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at:  
[http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2011/111123\\_SIDS.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2011/111123_SIDS.doc.htm)
- . "UN Charter." Accessed on 1 June 2013 at:  
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>
- (2005): *World Summit Outcome*. New York: United Nations General Assembly, October 24th 2005. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf>
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1995): *Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development*. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at:  
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/text-version/agreements/poach2.htm>
- UNEP (2009): *Climate Change Science Compendium*. New York: United Nations. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at:  
[http://www.unep.org/pdf/ccScienceCompendium2009/cc\\_ScienceCompendiu](http://www.unep.org/pdf/ccScienceCompendium2009/cc_ScienceCompendiu)



m2009\_full\_en.pdf

UNISDR (2005): Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations

and Communities to Disasters. New York: UN, 2005. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/1037>

Weis, Thomas and Sam Daws (2008). The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

WHO (2010). Climate Change and Health. Factsheet No. 266, January 2010. Accessed on 1 June 2013 at: <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs266/en/>

Zifcak Spencer (2010): The Responsibility to Protect.” In Evans, Malcolm D. (Ed.) International Law 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

## Annex: Legal Principles for Humanitarian Intervention and basic principles for RtoP

### A. Three Pillars of RtoP

1. The state's responsibility to protect its population from crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and from their incitement.
2. The international community's (UN Member States) duty to assist states in meeting these obligations.
3. The responsibility of the international community to act within a reasonable time scope and in a decisive manner in cases where a state fails to provide protection from the above mentioned mass atrocities (Luck, 2008).

### B. Criteria for Legitimate Intervention (ICISS)

1. The threatened harm must be serious, i.e. it must involve genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing.
2. The primary purpose of the intervention must be to halt the threatened humanitarian catastrophe.
3. Military intervention must be adopted only as a measure of last resort.
4. The proposed military action must be proportionate to the threat.

The adverse consequences flowing from the military intervention should clearly be less than the consequences of inaction (ICISS, 2001).

## About the Author

Ziggy Vandebriel is Analyst in the Environment and Sustainable Development Section. Ziggy holds a BA in International Affairs from Vesalius College, Brussels with a special focus on European Peace and Security Studies (in cooperation with the Royal Military School of Brussels) and a MA in Environmental Law and Sustainable Development from the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. His research interests include humanitarian crises, peacekeeping, environmental refugees and the security aspect of climate change.

## About the Global Governance Institute

The Global Governance Institute (GGI) is an independent, non-profit think tank based in Brussels. GGI brings together policy-makers, scholars and practitioners from the world's leading institutions in order to devise, strengthen and improve forward-looking approaches to global governance.

Our core research areas are:

- Peace & Security
- International Law & Human Rights
- Environment & Sustainable Development
- Economic Policy
- Forward Studies & Innovation

## Our Vision

Our vision is a more equitable, peaceful and sustainable global order based on effective but accountable international organizations, the global rule of law and the empowerment of the individual across borders and cultures. GGI places particular emphasis on the improvement of the United Nations system and its mutual reinforcement with strong regional organizations.

## Our Mission

Our mission is to promote comprehensive research, cutting-edge analysis and innovative advice on core policy issues, informed by a truly global perspective. This also includes raising awareness about major challenges of global governance among the general public.

Our vision is a more equitable, peaceful and sustainable global order based on effective but accountable international organizations, the global rule of law and the empowerment of the individual across borders and cultures. GGI places particular emphasis on the improvement of the United Nations system and its mutual reinforcement with strong regional organizations. For further information and enquiries, contact us at [info@globalgovernance.eu](mailto:info@globalgovernance.eu). For more information, please visit: [www.globalgovernance.eu](http://www.globalgovernance.eu)

The Global Governance Institute (GGI) v.z.w./a.s.b.l. is a non-profit association registered under Belgian law. Registration No. 831.178.152