



GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE
INSTITUTE

ALEXANDRA NOVOSSELOFF

**UNITED NATIONS - EUROPEAN UNION
COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEKEEPING:
*CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS***

GGI Analysis Paper No. 4/2012

June 2012

The Global Governance Institute
Pleinlaan 5,
1050 Brussels, Belgium
Email: info@globalgovernance.eu
Web: www.globalgovernance.eu

GGI Analysis Paper Series

Peace & Security

© The Global Governance Institute (GGI)

June 2012

Series Editors:

Joachim A. Koops & Hubertus Jürgenliemk

www.globalgovernance.eu

info@globalgovernance.eu

Copyright by the Global Governance Institute, Brussels. Citations and comments are welcome, however, the content of this publication may not be copied or reproduced except for personal, non-commercial purposes.

For any other use, the written consent of the Global Governance Institute is required.

Summary*

Partnerships between the United Nations (UN) and other International Organizations in the field of Peacekeeping have become a central feature of contemporary Global Security Governance. Since the early 2000s, the UN's relationship with the European Union (EU) has developed as one of the most institutionalized partnerships of its kind. Yet, even though both organizations pursue similar objectives and seem –on first sight- like natural partners, a wide range of challenges and limitations currently hamper their effective cooperation. This *GGI Analysis* provides an in-depth analysis of the historical evolution of the UN-EU partnership, of the major elements of its institutionalisation as well as of the successes and tensions that have arisen from joint operations in the field. Examining also more recent cases of UN-EU cooperation, such as in the case of Kosovo and the Chad, the paper identifies major obstacles and challenges and offers several recommendations towards a more coherent and mutually reinforcing partnership.

Keywords: UN-EU Cooperation; Peacekeeping; Peacebuilding; EUFOR RD Congo; EUFOR Tchad/RCA; MONUC; MINURCAT

About the Author

Dr. Alexandra Novosseloff is a Senior Expert in the Peace and Security Section of the Global Governance Institute (GGI). She is also a research associate at the Centre Thucydide, University of Paris-Panthéon-Assas. Her area of expertise lies in the field of international organizations and peacekeeping - with particular emphasis on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations. She has held research positions at the International Peace Institute, the UNESCO and at the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union. Dr. Novosseloff holds a PhD in political science from the University of Paris-Panthéon-Assas and is a member of the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations at the University of Montréal and of the Association of Internationalists.

Alexandra can be contacted at anovosseloff@globalgovernance.eu

* This is an updated and expanded version of an earlier paper, published in Joachim Krause / Natalino Ronzitti (eds), *The EU, the UN and Collective Security – Making Multilateralism Effective*, 2012, London and New York, Routledge,

Table of Contents

Introduction	Page 6
Historical Background: UN-EU Cooperation in Peacekeeping	Page 8
Current Challenges and Obstacles	Page 12
Prospects for Strengthening UN-EU Cooperation	Page 17
Conclusion and Recommendations	Page 22
Annexes	Page 25
About the Global Governance Institute	Page 30

List of acronyms

CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration
DFS	Department for Field Support
DPA	Department for Political Affairs
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EULEX	EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUPM	EU Police Mission
EUSR	Special Representative of the European Union
FARDC	Congolese Armed Forces
FHQ	Force Headquarters
GAC	General Affairs Council
ICO	International Civilian Office
IPTF	International Police Task Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force (NATO, Afghanistan)
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	UN Mission for the Stabilisation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SFOR	Stabilisation Force (NATO, Bosnia-Herzegovina)
SHIRBRIG	Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations
SSR	Security Sector Reform
INTERFET	Interim Force in East Timor
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

Introduction

The European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) at first sight appear to be natural partners in peacekeeping operations. Both have similar objectives; this was affirmed in the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management on 24 September 2003 just months after the EU launched its first operation. A joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management on 7 June 2007 reiterated cooperation. Key points of these agreements were: ministerial meetings with the UN Secretary-General, meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee with the UN Deputy Secretary-General and the Under Secretaries-General, as well as at other level and contacts between the Council Secretariat, the Commission and the United Nations Secretariat.²

The United Nations is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The European Union willingly affirms the primary responsibility and the legitimacy of the UN Security Council in dealing with international peace and security: “Strengthening the UN, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively is a European priority”.³ The EU Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003, favours a stronger international society, structured through international institutions and based on international law. In its 2008 follow-up to the ESS member states of the European Union confirmed that the United Nations, “stands at the apex of the international system”⁴, and is a major partner to cooperate with in global crisis management. In May 2010, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and

Security Policy of the European Union, Lady Catherine Ashton, stated in front of the UN Security Council that: “A core objective of EU foreign policy is the development of an effective multilateral system with a strong UN at the centre”.

The EU-UN relationship underwent five phases: a phase of “inaction” (1999-2002), an “experimental” phase (2002-2003), “a phase of institutional convergence” (2003-2006), an active phase (2006-2009) and, finally, a phase of apathy (2009 to date) due to the new developments of CSDP after the Lisbon Treaty and to some difficult experiences on the ground (such as the transition between EUFOR Tchad/RCA and MINURCAT).⁵ These phases correspond also to different roles played by each organisation in trying to advance its interests, to their internal and inter-organisational dynamics. A decade has passed since the establishment of this cooperation that proved to be an uneasy and un-natural⁶ one even if it remained useful in the context of an increasing complexity in crisis management.

But how far has the implementation of these agreements come? And have they actually resulted in an effective partnership for peace? What does this really mean in the area of peacekeeping operations where the UN has much more experience of deploying operations? Are both organisations complementing each other or are they, in fact, competing with one another?

The purpose of this paper is to assess the UN-EU cooperation. It will start by discussing the ambition of UN-EU

² EU General Affairs Council Conclusions, 2356th Council meeting, Luxembourg, 11-12 June 2001. On further details for relations between Secretariats, see Novosseloff, Alexandra, 2004, *EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management – Developments and Prospects*, Report of the International Peace Academy, New York, 28 pages.

³ European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, 12 December 2003, p. 7.

⁴ *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy*, “Providing Security in a Changing World”, 11 December 2008, p. 11.

⁵ Gowan, Richard, “ESDP and the United Nations”, in Grevi, Giovanni/Helly, Damien/Keohane, Daniel (eds), 2009, *European Security and Defence Policy – The first 10 years (1999-2009)*, European Union Institute for Security Studies.

⁶ See Tardy, Thierry, 2010, “Building Partnerships in Peace Operations: The Limits of the Global/Regional Approach », *GCSP Policy Paper n°1*.

cooperation, before outlining the key statements and institutional developments.

partnership, it needs to be revitalised politically, institutionally and operationally.

This is followed by a detailed analysis of UN-EU cooperation at the operational level. Before closing, the paper offers ways to improve the cooperation in peacekeeping for both organisations to achieve more effective burden sharing and a unity of effort that is indispensable in current crisis management. If both organisations wish to develop their

However, the opportunity for progresses and effectiveness of that partnership will nonetheless depend greatly upon the political will of their respective member States, and on the room of manoeuvre given to both Secretariats.

Table 1: Contributions of European States To UN Peacekeeping Operations

Rank	Country	Number of troops deployed			Total	Percentage of the UN peacekeeping budget
		Police	Observers	Troops		
18	Italy	5	18	1 299	1 322	4,999 %
21	France	60	21	1 103	1 184	7,554 %
24	Spain	34	2	1 018	1 054	3,177 %
35	Austria	0	9	531	540	0,851 %
39	Ireland	18	22	452	492	0,498 %
46	Portugal	183	5	126	314	0,511 %
48	United Kingdom	2	5	277	284	8,147 %
50	Germany	11	1	229	241	8,018 %
54	Slovakia	0	2	198	201	0,042 %
59	Belgium	2	5	121	128	1,075 %
64	Hungary	0	7	81	88	0,116 %
74	Greece	0	0	53	53	0,691 %
76	Sweden	25	22	3	50	1,064 %
77	Romania	47	31	0	78	0,053 %
80	Netherlands	18	14	8	40	1,855 %
82	Finland	0	24	16	40	0,566 %
85	Denmark	0	19	12	31	0,736 %
92	Slovenia	0	3	14	17	0,103 %
95	Poland	1	12	0	13	0,248 %
99	Czech Republic	5	5	0	10	0,209 %
104	Bulgaria	0	2	2	4	0,011 %
109	Cyprus	0	0	2	2	0,046 %
110	Estonia	0	2	0	2	0,040 %
112	Lithuania	2	0	0	2	0,019 %
TOTAL		407	222	6 312	6 943	40,747 %*
		7,02% of contributions to peacekeeping			40,7% of the PK budget	

* with the financial contributions of Latvia (0,011%) and Malta (0,017%), countries that do not participate in UN peacekeeping operations.

	In the 15 PKOs	In the 5 PKOs in Africa	UNMIL ⁽¹⁾	MONUSCO ⁽²⁾	MINUSTAH ⁽³⁾
UN Member States	98,829	70,308	9,200	18,997	12,252
EU Member States	6 943	204	39	106	114
Percentage	7,02%	0,29%	0,42%	0,55%	0,93%

(1) where EU member states are mainly deploying police officers.

(2) where EU member states are mainly deploying police and military staff officers.

(3) where EU member states are mainly deploying police officers.

Source: Numbers as of end of July 2011, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>

Historical Background: UN-EU Cooperation in Peacekeeping

UN-EU cooperation intensified after the Franco-British Saint-Malo Summit of 1998 and the European Council of Cologne in 1999 that institutionalised a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, since the Lisbon treat renamed to CSDP). The EU needed to launch concrete actions and to prove that it is able to become a credible actor with new capabilities in crisis management. At the UN, it also wanted to be perceived as something more than just a “lobby group”, a “funding organisation” or a “monetary weight” that is contributing to 38,8% of the regular UN budget and to 40,7% of its peacekeeping one.⁷ This cooperation developed in Europe with the need on the part of the UN to leave a post-conflict country (as it was also increasingly asked to be deployed on other continents, especially in Africa) for which the EU offered a way of leaving in a sustainable way. In Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, the EU’s ambitions also served as an exit strategy for the UN. In short, there was in the early 2000s an immediate and concrete need for such cooperation to occur.

The institutional basis of such cooperation was first laid down at the European Council of Nice (2000). It acknowledged the principle of a relationship between the UN and the EU that “allows Europeans to answer in an efficient and coherent manner to the requests of leading organisations such as the UN and the OSCE”. One of the goals of the Presidency was then to “identify possible areas of cooperation, as well as their modalities, of cooperation between the EU and the UN in crisis management”. The conclusions of the Swedish Presidency of the EU at the Gothenburg Summit recall that “military and civilian capacities of the European Union, in development, bring an added value to the crisis management activities/actions of the United Nations”. Two key goals were pronounced during this

time: (1) to develop “mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention” and (2) to ensure “that the EU’s evolving military and civilian capacities would provide real added value for UN crisis management”.⁸ The decisions of the June 2001 European Summit of Gothenburg slowly initiated institutional contacts and working relationships between the two Secretariats.⁹ High-level meetings between the UN Secretary-General and the EU High Representative had already begun to take place regularly since an initial meeting in October 2000 in Brussels.¹⁰ In June 2001, the EU General Affairs Council defined three themes of cooperation (conflict prevention, crisis management and regional issues), and agreed on “a platform for intensified cooperation” **involving four levels:**

1. “EU Ministerial meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Secretary-General;
2. Meetings and contacts between the EU High Representative and European Commission External Relations Commissioner with the UN Secretary-General and the UN Deputy Secretary-General;
3. Political and Security Committee meetings, where appropriate in Troika format, with the UN Deputy Secretary-General and Under Secretaries-General;

⁸ Conclusions – Items approved without debate, 2356th Council meeting, EU General Affairs Council, Luxembourg, 11-12 June 2001.

⁹ At the European Summit of Laeken, ‘the Union has begun to cooperate more fully with the United Nations in crisis management and conflict prevention concerning the themes and in the specific areas endorsed by the Gothenburg European Council. Regular contacts at different levels with the representatives of the United Nations have made it possible to keep up the necessary links on the main subjects of common interest. Those contacts have also led to examination, on the basis of the principles and procedures established, of how the development of European capabilities in the ESDP could contribute to United Nations efforts in peacekeeping operations’. Presidency Report on European Security and Defense policy, 22 December 2001, paragraph 22.

¹⁰ In October 2000, the Troika first met with the UN Secretary-General who suggested creating working groups on various themes. The EU Political and Security Committee found this measure premature, as well as the opening of discussions on peacekeeping.

⁷ The figures are taken from the United Nations Peacekeeping Factsheet, July 2011: Annex 2.

and other levels and formats as appropriate;

4. Contacts of the Council Secretariat and the Commission services with the UN Secretariat at the appropriate levels”.¹¹

The initial thinking about the development of an institutional cooperation rapidly gave way to an operational cooperation as circumstances commanded, in particular in the Balkans.

Formalizing Relations: Joint Declaration, Joint Statements...Common Purpose?

The experience gained on the ground led to the process of formalising it at the institutional level. The EU General Affairs Council (GAC) conclusions of July 21st, 2003, made crisis management a priority in the EU's relations with the UN.¹² A framework for regular consultations between the two organizations was created by the “*Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management*”, signed on September 24th, 2003 (under the Italian Presidency of the EU). It identified four areas of cooperation that should be further developed:

1. *Planning*: including reciprocal assistance in assessment missions and greater contact and cooperation between mission planning units;
2. *Training*: the establishment of joint training standards, procedures and planning for military and civilian personnel the synchronisation of pre-deployment training; and the institutionalisation of training seminars, conferences and exercises;
3. *Communication*: greater cooperation between situation centres; exchange of liaison officers whenever required;

establishment of desk-to-desk dialogue through the respective liaison offices in New York and Brussels;

4. *Best practices*: regular and systematic exchange of lessons learned and best practices information, including information on mission hand-over and procurement.

A mechanism for consultations, *the Steering Committee*, was then established to increase the coordination in those areas between the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) of the UN Secretariat, on one side, and the structures of the EU (General Council Secretariat, including the EU Military Staff, and the Commission) on the other. The Steering Committee usually meets twice a year. This does not prevent the Head of DPKO from regularly briefing the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) on operations where both organisations are involved, and the EU High Representative – now the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union – from doing the same in front of the Security Council. Intervening at the request of the Italian representative to the UN on behalf of the EU Presidency, Javier Solana addressed the UN Security Council on 18 July 2003 in relation to the EU's Operation Artemis. He also briefed the UN on Eufor RD Congo on 9 January 2007 and on Eufor Tchad/RCA on 24 September 2008.¹³ More recently, the EU High Representative Ashton made a statement in front of the UN Security Council on “Growing co-operation between the UN and the EU in the area of peace and security”.¹⁴

This first Joint Declaration was strengthened through the adoption by the European Council of two documents defining the

¹¹ EU General Affairs Council Conclusions, 2356th Council meeting, Luxembourg, 11-12 June 2001. On further details for relations between Secretariats, see Alexandra Novosseloff (2004), *EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management – Developments and Prospects*, Report of the International Peace Academy, New York, 28 pages.

¹² General Affairs and External Relations Conclusions, 2522nd Council meeting, Brussels, 21 July 2003.

¹³ This mechanism is a more substantive one than what has been used for SFOR, KFOR and ISAF, for which 3-page reports are sent to the Council every three months.

¹⁴ Specific meeting of the UN Security Council on the cooperation with the European Union, under the item “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, 4 May 2010, S/PV.6306.

modalities of cooperation in the military and civilian aspects of crisis management (2004), drawing on the experience in the field of the first operations led in cooperation with the UN.¹⁵ This allowed the EU to elaborate on the possible scenarios of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management (always implying the respect of an EU chain of command with the strategic and political control of the PSC)¹⁶ and to put some conditions for its involvement. In the face of UN demands and expectations, the EU has elaborated principles and prerequisites for participating in crisis management and for putting its civilian and military instruments at the disposal of other organisations. These basic principles are, and remain since then, the following:

- The EU will retain through the PSC the political control and strategic direction of any of its operations;
- Such cooperation will take place on a case-by-case basis;
- There would be no automatic involvement;
- The EU does not constitute a pool of forces but can only intervene by conducting specific missions or operations, and there would be no earmarked forces to any stand-by arrangements.¹⁷

Progressively, the two organisations realized that, despite their wish to cooperate together, they have differing political agendas, objectives, means and institutional procedures. This can put limits and obstacles at times to their cooperation on the ground, and lead to some “ambiguous results”.¹⁸ As Thierry Tardy pointed out, “the UN-EU

relationship in crisis management remains constrained by political, structural and cultural obstacles that can only be overcome to a certain extent. Cooperation is crucial and recognised as such on both sides, but comes second for institutions that are constantly struggling for their own comparative advantages, visibility and identity.”¹⁹ And the fact is that member states conduct, strangely enough, different policies in each organization and have difficulties in aligning their positions. This is certainly due to a lack of coordination within capitals, but also to the pursuit of different interests in each organization for different purposes and at different levels.

Nevertheless, under the German Presidency of the EU in the first semester of 2007²⁰, a Joint Statement (and not a Declaration as in 2003) on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management was adopted. The German authorities wanted to strengthen this cooperation, in particular by drawing some lessons from their involvement in the EU operation in the DRC, at the request of the UN Secretary-General and in order to support MONUC during the Congolese Presidential Elections process.²¹ They also wanted to avoid in the future the ‘surprise element’ of a UN request for EU support.

¹⁵ General Secretariat of the Council, “EU-UN Cooperation in civilian crisis management operations – Elements of implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration”, 8 October 2004.

¹⁶ See the possible scenarios developed in Annex 3.

¹⁷ Presidency report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defense Policy, 11 June 2001, Brussels.

¹⁸ Claudia Major, “EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006”, *Occasional Paper n°72*, September 2008, European Institute for Security Studies, 42 pages.

¹⁹ Tardy, Thierry, 2009, “UN-EU Relations in Military Crisis Management: Institutionalization and Key Constraints”, in Joachim Koops (ed.) *Military Crisis Management: The Challenge of Inter-organizationalism*, Special Issue of *Studia Diplomatica*, vol LXII, n°3, p. 52.

²⁰ Joint Declaration on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management, 24 September 2004: http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_2768_en.ht

²¹ As pointed out by Javier Solana in front of the UN Security Council, ‘EUFOR intervention, in close cooperation with MONUC (the UN mission), was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a particularly sensitive moment in the election process. In addition to that, EUFOR confirmed its position of neutrality in the eyes of the Congolese population and reinforced its credibility’. EUHR Solana’s Presentation on Democratic Republic of Congo/EUFOR at UN Security Council, 9 January 2007: New York. Nevertheless, as Richard Gowan explained, ‘the experience of EUFOR RD Congo caused frustration in Germany, which provided the second-largest contingent for the mission. Officials in Berlin felt that the UN had pushed them into an unnecessary operation and that the structures put in place in 2003-4 gave EU member States too little oversight of relations with the UN’. “ESDP and the United Nations”, in Grevi, Giovanni/Helly, Damien/Keohane, Daniel (eds), 2009, *op.cit.*, p.120.

They thus tried to emphasize the need for better control exercised by EU member states over the EU-UN partnership, rather than leaving it to the discretion of both secretariats. The EUFOR RD Congo operation, launched in July 2006, was limited in time (four months) and in scope (Kinshasa). It comprised some 400 to 450 troops in the Congo as well as a battalion-size “over the horizon” force, as a strategic reserve located in Libreville (Gabon). The Operational Headquarters provided by Germany were located in Potsdam.

The *Joint Statement* indeed acknowledged the fact that the African continent had become a new theatre of operation for UN-EU cooperation and contained new prospects such as the “support to African peacekeeping capacity-building” and the “cooperation on aspects of multidimensional peacekeeping, including police, rule of law and security sector reform”. It sought also to “further enhance mutual cooperation and coordination” through “regular senior-level political dialogue”²², the “pursuit of the establishment of specific coordination and cooperation mechanisms for crisis situations where the UN and the EU are jointly engaged”, as well as “systematic UN-EU joint lessons learned exercises following cases of joint operational cooperation.”

However, all these recommendations seemed to have been forgotten in the context of the challenges of new UN-EU transition processes of operations in Kosovo and Chad.

Learning By Doing? UN-EU Cooperation on the Ground

UN-EU cooperation has been, from the start, an “operations-driven” form of cooperation. Its first “test case” took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) in the field of civilian crisis management (police). At the doorsteps of Europe, in the Balkans, where the EU’s interests are directly at stake, such action was fully supported by all EU member states. After a one-year period of transition, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) was launched in January 2003, taking over the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the International Police Task Force (IPTF).²³

The transition process encompassed four key elements. First, a European, the Danish Commissioner Sven-Christian Frederiksen was sequentially appointed as the head of IPTF, then as the head of the EU Planning Mission in BiH (August-December 2002) and, finally, as the head of the EU Police Mission. Second, the High Representative in BiH was also named Special Representative of the EU (EUSR). Third, the EU sent a planning mission nine months prior to the handover from the UN. Fourth, a small UN liaison office (11 staff members) remained from January to June 30, 2003 in the EUPM headquarters in order to provide assistance to EUPM, to complete the transfer of databases, and to liaise with the locals. The deployment, in December 2004, of an EU military force (Operation Althea), taking over from the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR), brought a new turn to the involvement of the EU (Resolution 1639), with a presence of 7 000 soldiers at the

²² In 2008, for example, the EU troika meeting on 27 September 2008 with the UN Secretary General, chaired by the SG/HR, addressed EU-UN cooperation in crisis management both in general terms, and specifically EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EULEX Kosovo; Alain Le Roy, USG for Peacekeeping Operations, addressed the PSC on 17 October; Ambassador Johan Verbeke, UN Special Representative, updated the PSC on 24 November 2008 on developments of Geneva talks (Georgia conflict); Edmond Mulet, ASG for Peacekeeping Operations, attended the meeting of CONUN on 9 July at the invitation of the French Presidency.

²³ On 28 February 2002, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council accepted the offer made by the EU. On 4 March 2002, the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina invited the EU to assume responsibility for the follow-on to the UN police mission. The UN Security Council Resolution 1396 welcomed the PIC decision on 5 March 2002. The EU Police Mission is created by the Council Joint action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 March 2002. EUPM was composed of about 484 international policemen, 66 civilian experts, and about 337 local staff. The EUPM reported through the EU Special Representative to the High Representative in Brussels.

outset (currently around 2 000). The EU's CSDP thus developed and became operational in Europe, where the EU has additional instruments at its disposal – such as offering long-term membership perspective to countries in the Balkans.

In the summer of 2003, UN-EU cooperation broke new grounds with “Operation Artemis”. This was the EU's first rapid military deployment in support of a UN Mission in Africa - the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The EU operation specifically answered a request from the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The EU decision came a week after the authorization of the UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003) calling for the deployment of “an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia in close coordination with MONUC”.²⁴ The EU intervention took the shape of a rapid reaction force of some 1,800 troops to restore the security situation in Ituri, a province in the North-East of DRC. Twelve EU member states contributed to Artemis, with France as the “framework nation”, thus providing the Operational Headquarters and the bulk of the force.²⁵ It had a strict time limit, and allowed the UN to strengthen its own operation and to extend its mandate. The EU and the UN worked in close cooperation throughout the planning and deployment phases of Artemis: the deployment of the UN troop reinforcements benefited from EU logistical support, joint planning of the transition period, co-localisation of MONUC and Artemis field headquarters, implementation of coordination mechanisms such as regular meetings and liaison officers and visit of the Artemis Force Commander in New York.

²⁴ Common Action 2003/423/CFSP, 5 June 2003, OJ L 143, p. 50.

²⁵ The operational headquarters (OHQ) were located in Paris and included officers from several participating countries as well as officials from the General Secretariat of the EU Council. The Force Headquarters (FHQ) was located in Entebbe (Uganda) with an advanced position in Bunia (DRC).

Building on the success of Operation Artemis, France and the United Kingdom proposed in November 2003 “a new initiative for the EU to focus on the development of its rapid reaction capabilities to enhance its ability to help the UN in short-term crisis management situations”.²⁶ In December 2003, the EU Council welcomed this proposal and developed the concept of “coherent, credible battle-groups” of 1,500 troops to be deployed at short notice and on a short-term basis. This mechanism – declared operational in 2007 – was in fact very EU centric (with very little engagement with the UN), and has not been used to date for any EU operation nor any strategic reserve for UN operations, as Member States remain rather divided on the conditions and (financial) arrangements of their deployment.²⁷

Current Challenges and Obstacles

Since 2006-7, the EU and the UN are more and more intertwined. Increasingly, EU missions are deployed where the UN is already engaged. But both organizations are also, more than often, evolving in separate worlds: deployed in the same country, but not necessarily coordinating with each other. There are in fact a series of parallel (or co-located) missions where cooperation between the two organizations is minimal or even non-existent, such as in Afghanistan (EUPOL and UNAMA), in DRC (EUSEC/EUPOL and MONUSCO), in Somalia (EUNAVFOR and UNPOS). The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia did not coordinate much with the then UN Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Two recent cases seem to be more positive in this respect: the handover of the UN mission in Kosovo to an EU mission (EULEX); and the handover of EUFOR Tchad/RCA to the UN Mission in

²⁶ “Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defense”, Franco-British Summit, London, 24 November 2003.

²⁷ As some member states could be flexible on their use, some others consider that the Battle Groups could only and strictly be used for an emergency situation where a military operation is needed.

Chad and the Central Africa Republic (MINURCAT).

UN-EU cooperation in Kosovo and in Chad

After the adoption of the Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in 2007, the two organisations worked together in Chad where the EU was supposed to support the UN to deploy the military component of MINURCAT and in Kosovo where the UN wanted to hand over its 10-year-mission to an EU civilian (police and rule of law) mission. In both cases, the events contradicted the initial plans: in Kosovo, contrary to the initial plan, the UN had to remain and not transfer all of its tasks to the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX); in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR), EUFOR became the bridging operation of MINURCAT.

The envisaged smooth transition between the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and EULEX was disturbed by the unsuccessful negotiations held in the Security Council in 2008 about the end of the UN mission – the Russians threatening to veto any resolution recognising the independence of Kosovo, and thus putting an end to Resolution 1244 (1999). As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN Secretariat wanted to hand over the peacebuilding process to the EU, as EU membership was envisaged by the Kosovars as a natural end state of integration in their regional environment. The International Civilian Office (ICO)²⁸ and EULEX, operational since April 2009, were supposed to replace UNMIK. But the lack of international legal grounds for the presence of the two new missions weakened their legitimacy, even more so as not all EU member states recognised the independence

²⁸ Kosovo's Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008 expressly invited an international civilian presence, as it was envisaged in the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, drawn up by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Kosovo. The International Civilian Office supervises the independence of Kosovo in accordance with the Status Settlement. The head of ICO was also the EU Special Representative in Kosovo until early 2011. His task was to support the European future for Kosovo.

of Kosovo.²⁹ The fact that the presence of EULEX was only acknowledged by the EU complicated its official relationships with other international organisations deployed in Kosovo under Resolution 1244 (UN, NATO, OSCE). This froze the deployment of the EU mission for a few months. EULEX could not use the assets left by UNMIK, as initially planned. This created many legal and logistical complications for the EU (despite the on-going dialogue between the two secretariats on practical issues).³⁰ It was only when the neutrality status of EULEX got confirmed, mainly on the insistence of the five EU non-recognising countries, that the formal technical arrangements could be finalised. Even more, the EU had to accept that EULEX would operate “under a UN umbrella” and within the overall framework of the UN status neutrality.

Moreover, EULEX could not immediately deploy in the North of Kosovo due to Serbian opposition. Indeed, the Serbian authorities only recognized the presence of NATO and the UN to start off with. However, these difficulties were slowly reduced as tensions decreased and as EULEX was able to establish direct contacts with Belgrade (through a liaison office). UNMIK³¹ thus had to remain in place; its civilian international and local personnel still currently includes 445 persons.³² It is mainly deployed in the North of Kosovo, in the town of *Mitrovica* where the local

²⁹ This is the case of Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain. As of August 2011, only 79 states have recognized the independence of Kosovo.

³⁰ During the transition phase, the handover of police and prosecutorial files was chaotic. The Planning Team was never able to get all the files and prepare to plan accordingly.

³¹ Without changing its name, UNMIK became an assistance mission to the Kosovar authorities. The role of the other international organizations is under the “*overall status-neutral authority of UN*”. See SG Report of June 2008. The OSCE has maintained its mission mandated with the promotion of human rights and good governance. The European Agency for Reconstruction (managed on behalf of the European Commission) in charge of economic reconstruction has put an end to its mission.

³² As of April 2012: 148 international civilian personnel, 218 local staff, 24 UN Volunteers, 9 Military Liaison Officers and 6 police officers.

authorities only accept a low-profile presence of EULEX. There, UNMIK still plays a role of a more or less reliable facilitator between EULEX and the local authorities, when needed. In the rest of the country, UNMIK is only involved where the Kosovar authorities cannot exert their sovereignty and in some residual tasks (community issues, returns, property, cultural and religious heritage, human rights, minorities).³³ In the end, except in the North, cooperation is not an issue anymore for the two organisations on the ground, since their respective missions are very different in their contents. However, “under the UN umbrella”, the EU has to report substantially to the UN. Therefore, the “Report of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo” is attached to the report of the UN Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, and constitutes its annex 1 since 2009.³⁴

Arguably, UN-EU cooperation reached a new level with the transition between EUFOR Tchad/RCA and a United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). Firstly, it took place in an “unexplored” and difficult theatre for both organisations and secondly the EU launched there its second largest military operation (3,400 soldiers from 25 contributing countries) to date. But this handover was in fact a difficult process and underlined some of the difficulties of

communication between the two organisations. The EU operation was initially conceived to be a military element (“to establish a safe and secure environment”) of the broader “multidimensional presence” constituted by MINURCAT (Resolution 1778, 25 September 2007). But the deployment of MINURCAT suffered from the unstable security situation (attacks of rebels towards Ndjamená) at the very beginning (January 2008), and from the reluctance of the Chadian government to welcome the presence of the UN. This situation prevented the civilian/police component of MINURCAT from deploying at the same time as the military deployment of EUFOR.³⁵ Therefore, EUFOR eventually became a first-entry force (“a bridging force”³⁶) with the aim of stabilising the security situation, thereby setting the stage for the deployment of a military force provided by the UN as part of a renewed MINURCAT (March 2009).³⁷

The coordination between the two operations during their conduct phase, throughout 2008, was relatively smooth. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General met with the EUFOR Force Commander on a weekly basis and maintained regular meetings with the Operation Commander based in Paris. As put forward by the report of the Secretariat on UN-EU cooperation, there was “a well-established network of coordination

³³ The SG Report of 12 June 2008 defined the exact residual functions of UNMIK: ‘The United Nations presence will carry out the following functions, among others to be defined: (a) monitoring and reporting; (b) facilitating, where necessary and possible, arrangements for Kosovo’s engagement in international agreements; (c) facilitating dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade on issues of practical concern; and (d) functions related to the dialogue concerning the implementation of the provisions specified in my letter to Mr. Tadić and referenced in my letter to Mr. Sejdiu’. S/2008/354, §16.

³⁴ S/2009/149 (17 March 2009), S/2009/497 (30 September 2009), S/2010/5 (5 January 2010), S/2010/169 (6 April 2010), S/2010/562 (29 October 2011), S/2011/43 (28 January 2011), S/2011/81 (3 May 2011).

³⁵ See Pouyé, Raphaël, 2010, « Eufor Tchad/RCA et la protection des civils », *Annuaire français de relations internationales*, volume XI, 2010. <http://www.afri-ct.org/L-Eufor-Tchad-RCA-et-la-protection>

³⁶ For the EU, the “bridging model” ‘aims at providing the UN with time to mount a new operation or to reorganise an existing one. Such a model calls for rapid deployment of appropriate military capabilities and agreed duration and end-state’. In, “EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management operations – Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration”, 17-18 June 2004.

³⁷ See article by Alexander Mattelaer (2008), “The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations – The Case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA”, *IES Working Paper* n°5, 36 pages. See also Helly, Damien, 2010, “Lessons from EUFOR Tchad/RCA”, *Seminar Reports*, EU Institute for Security Studies. This section on the transition between EUFOR Tchad/RCA and MINURCAT is primarily based on the reading of these two papers.

mechanisms at all levels (Brussels, New York, OHQ, FHQ, MINURCAT), including reciprocal visits to New York, Brussels, Paris and Ndjamena or Abéché, and the integration of EU planners from the OHQ for the planning of the transition phase. The presence of the EU Military Staff Liaison Officer (LO) in New York facilitated the exchange of information. The deployment of a UN LO in the EU OHQ served as a confidence building tool and supported effective flow of information”.³⁸ However the planning for the handover phase was not as smooth as officially described. In fact, the differences within the UN and EU planning processes made it difficult to synchronise and communicate in sufficient detail about respective efforts. This is likely to remain a substantial challenge for effective joint action. Liaison aspects were addressed very late in the process, and were hampered by different procurement processes existing in the two organisations. There was no real information-sharing mechanism in place (which would have been particularly useful for joint risk/situation assessments). In short, the deployment and the transition processes between the two operations showed that there was a lack of communication and that the one hoped for support elements that the second could not provide.

The UN Secretariat also perceived the EU’s strict time limitation of EUFOR (the ‘end date’ rather than ‘end state’) and the absence of flexibility of EU member states in that regard as an illegitimate pressure, a lack of understanding of UN constraints and finally as an easy exit strategy for the EU. Finally, the short period of “re-hatting” (participation in the UN operation of forces previously committed to the EU operation) prevented MINURCAT from having the same deterrent effects as EUFOR and showed in fact the lack of interest of EU member states in offering a more substantial and more

³⁸ General Secretariat of the Council, “Progress Report on Recommendations for the Implementation of the Joint Statement on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management”, 15 December 2008.

long-term contribution to UN peacekeeping.³⁹

From Declaration to Implementation: Still a Long Way to Go...

These difficulties on the ground were reflected institutionally at headquarters. The Steering Committee faces some serious obstacles. At the UN-EU Steering Committee of January 2008, the two secretariats agreed to conduct an After-Action Review on UN-EU planning for EUFOR Tchad/RCA. But this only resulted in a vague exchange of views on different crises and respective operations. In November 2008, a special meeting on police issues took place at the margins of the Steering Committee. The meeting addressed the UN’s work on developing a strategic doctrinal framework for international peacekeeping, training, UN rapidly deployable capabilities, transition issues and recruitment. It was agreed to fine-tune the DPKO proposals for operational follow-up, in particular concerning training and the possible development of a strategic framework for international policing.⁴⁰ In 2009, however, the Steering Committee met only once - in December. In 2010 and 2011, the Steering Committee was not convened, due in particular to the implementation of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty and the reorganisation of European institutions. Overall, the Steering Committee is perceived by many as being of limited use when no operation is deployed jointly and when it only consists of a general exchange of

³⁹ As Thierry Tardy rightly pointed out: ‘The Artemis operation in the DRC in 2003, and the EUFOR RD Congo operation in 2006, show what the EU is ready to do in support of the UN, but also what it is not prepared to do – contributing directly to UN peace operations with troops for example. Overall, the UN Secretariat welcomes the EU’s will to be present in Africa through operational support and capacity-building, but is of the view that EU member states should also participate directly in UN-led operations.’ See Report “The European Union in Africa: A Strategic Partner in Peace Operations”, Seminar organized jointly by the International Peace Academy and the GCSP, July 2006, p. 12.

⁴⁰ General Secretariat of the Council, “Progress Report on Recommendations for the Implementation of the Joint Statement on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management”, 15 December 2008.

information on political aspects of crises. However, in January 2012 DPKO conducted a review of how to strengthen the UN-EU Steering Committee that addresses most of the major problems. It remains to be seen whether both the UN and the EU follow up on these recommendations and revitalize this institutional tool.

Apart from the establishment of formal contacts, and desk-to-desk dialogues between the two Secretariats, the remaining recommendations of the *UN-EU Declaration* and *Joint Statement* have not been implemented, in particular when it comes to procedures and specific mechanisms for cooperation and coordination. The fact that the UN does not have any system for sharing secured information prevents the EU (that has signed an information security agreement with NATO) from sharing confidential information with the UN, even though both UN-EU declarations recommend the establishment of regular relations between the two Situation Centres, and several reports recommend to “develop coordination to share situational analysis and early planning as appropriate, for theatres in which both organisations are likely to be operationally active, including mutual support”.⁴¹

Furthermore, no joint crisis management exercises have been organized since April 2005 with “EST05”, even though such exercises along with joint training and exchanges are regularly recommended as ways of addressing the structural differences between the two organisations.⁴² A few education days were organised in Brussels and in New York, an idea that came out as a practical application of the 2006 After Action Review, recognising that both organisations’ knowledge about the other was insufficient. Given that there was no follow-up, it seems that both secretariats

have limited time, resources or energy to devote to such exercises and that member states have little appetite for theoretical exercises in-between the launching of operations.

Moreover, the After-Action Review of MONUC-EUFOR RD Congo recommended in particular “the drafting of a roadmap outlining the sequence of necessary steps and processes on both sides”, the “drafting of terms of references for a UN-EU Coordination group”, the “drafting of a potential liaison arrangements”, “discussions on the possibility of a generic logistics framework”. The After-Action Review of MINURCAT-EUFOR Tchad /RCA recommended “the elaboration of a UN-EU roadmap on joint mission start-up, the drafting of framework arrangements for UN-EU cooperation on financing and logistics aspects, establishment of basic guidelines for joint assessment missions [and] review arrangements for information exchange”. In July 2008, the UN DPKO/DFS “Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions” were finalized and circulated to EU member States for information. They comprise:

- (i) a comparative road map of UN and EU planning processes;
- (ii) terms of reference for a UN-EU joint coordination group to support cooperation in planning;
- (iii) a checklist of elements usually included in UN Security Council Resolutions authorising the deployment of an EU operation; and
- (iv) a checklist of elements for inclusion in follow-up technical arrangements between the UN and the EU, including models for claims texts.

A framework arrangement on mutual logistical support or a model arrangement on logistical support has yet to be written and shared between the two institutions. Furthermore, the two organisations should

⁴¹ General Secretariat of the Council, “Recommendations for the Implementation of the Joint statement on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management”, 28 July 2008.

⁴² Helly, Damien, 2010, “Lessons from EUFOR Tchad/RCA”, *Seminar Reports*, EU Institute for Security Studies, p.12.

consider the following: the conditions under which the EU might transfer material to the UN following the termination of an EU mission or operation, and vice-versa, as well as the transfer of operational archives in-theatre and, where this is not possible, improving the access to information by the succeeding organisation, in particular where security or legal elements are a factor.⁴³

So far, the experience of UN-EU cooperation led to practical and technical cooperation, but circumvented major political aspects: “As concerns the political aspects, the question of how an intensified political dialogue at the beginning of a crisis could be conducted will depend on the actual circumstances and has to be decided on an ad hoc basis, also taking into account the necessity of respecting the decision making autonomy of each organisation”.⁴⁴

However, the UN-EU relationship would benefit greatly if it were strengthened by stronger political dialogues. The Belgium Presidency of 2010 suggested a possible coordination of the respective agendas of the Security Council and the PSC. Furthermore, the Steering Committee would need to be revitalised, especially in the substance of its discussions. It could also meet in various formats on various “hot” topics, when a crisis arises somewhere. The recent (Spring 2011) establishment of the UN Liaison Office in Brussels on crisis management is likely to strengthen that type of coordination.⁴⁵

Certain crises could also lead to a strong UN-EU partnership in negotiations and mediation. The EU could also support the wider political processes and strategies which UN peacekeeping operations are part of.

Prospects for Strengthening UN-EU Cooperation

Each and every incoming Presidency of the EU wishes to strengthen UN-EU cooperation, but the result is often more words than deeds. Since 2006, EU presidencies presented non-papers on that issue, with new areas to explore and new scenarios for UN-EU Cooperation. Regular progress reports were presented by the EU General Secretariat to the PSC. However, the progress is slow in the absence of an on-going operation and the two institutions appear often to remain rather jealous of their prerogatives.⁴⁶ They both wish to keep and give visibility of their action to their constituencies. As Thierry Tardy argued, “institutions do compete with each other (...): they must display a certain number of comparative advantages, as well as ensure their visibility and efficacy as security actors. Therefore they develop their own agenda, interests and objectives. These imperatives are not, by nature, conducive to inter-institutional cooperation and may, on the contrary, create conditions for competition”.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the EU is willing to cooperate in a very limited framework (in cases where it retains through the PSC the political control and strategic direction of its operations), and EU member states seem unwilling to contribute in substance to UN peacekeeping operations (with the exception of UNIFIL). One can legitimately ask whether UN-EU cooperation can progress without more committed military involvement of EU member states in UN peacekeeping. In other words, is UN-EU cooperation sustainable if EU member states (that have left UN peacekeeping after the UN “failures” in the Balkans) do not contribute significantly to UN peacekeeping operations?

⁴³ General Secretariat of the Council, “Implementation of the Joint statement on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management”, 17 October 2007 and 28 July 2008.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ The representative of that Liaison Office is a joint DPA/DPKO appointment. The task is also to liaise with NATO institutions.

⁴⁶ See article of Kristin M.Haugevik on motives of international organizations to cooperate, “New partners, new possibilities – The evolution of inter-organizational security cooperation in international peace and security”, *NUPI Report*, 2007, 31 pages.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

Possible Options and Scenarios for Military aspects of Crisis Management

After ten years of regular cooperation, many of the envisaged scenarios have now been implemented. **The first scenario** to be implemented was “*an EU operation mandated by the UN Security Council conducted with or without NATO’s assets*”, one that requires minimum cooperation between the EU and the UN at the operational level. Rather, cooperation takes place at the political level to coordinate decisions, including the necessary UN Security Council resolution and the European Council Joint Action, and poses the issue of settling on acceptable practices for reporting to the Security Council. Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina corresponds to that scenario. One has to point out that the first EU operation in the framework of ESDP (“Operation Concordia”) was not formally authorized by a resolution of the UN Security Council.

The second scenario to be implemented was “*an EU-led operation in charge of the security presence, with the UN in charge of the civilian presence*” – (“Kosovo model”). In this case, cooperation between the EU and the UN would take place through the presence of liaison officers that help coordinate the action on the ground, inform decisions and actions of both headquarters, and ease the potential tensions between the two organisations. Thus, effective coordination is contingent on the will and efforts of each head/commander of operation. Such scenario was never implemented as such. It could have happened if the NATO force in Kosovo (KFOR) would have handed over to an EU one, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2005, but EU member states preferred the “lighter” option of deploying a civilian mission (EULEX). If EUFOR Tchad/RCA had been deployed in parallel to MINURCAT, it would have corresponded to the main features of this scenario.

Scenarios for UN-EU Cooperation in Military Aspects of Crisis Management	
Model	Example
National contributions to a UN operation (possible involvement of the EU through the ‘Clearing House’ mechanism)	UNIFIL 2
Stand alone operation -> EU-led operation mandated by the UN Security Council with no simultaneous UN deployment	Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bridging model -> EU-led operation before a UN take over	Artemis DRC EUFOR Chad/CAR
Stand-by / Over-the-horizon -> EU-led operation in support of an existing UN operation	EUFOR DRC (2006)
Supporting model / focussed support -> EU provides capabilities (logistics, air support, etc.) to the UN	EU Assistance Mission to AMIS in Darfur
Modular approach -> EU component of a UN operation (with the EU component operating under political control and strategic direction of the EU) -> hypothetically, EU component under UN command (more likely in the civilian sphere)	No example to date
Joint / Hybrid operation -> UN and EU running a joint operation	No example to date
<small>Source: Thierry Tardy, “United Nations – European Union Relations in Crisis Management”, Background Paper, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2008 Sources: “EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations – Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration”, Annex II, ESDP Presidency Report, European Council, 15 June 2004; “EU-UN Cooperation in Civilian Crisis Management”, Annex IV to the Annex, ESDP Presidency Report, European Council, 13 December 2004; “Military aspects of UN-EU cooperation in crisis management operations in the light of EUFOR RDC”, Seminar Report, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2007. Chart from Thierry Tardy, “EU-UN Relations in Peace Operations”, 3 July 2003, IPA Vienna Seminar.</small>	

The third scenario to be implemented was “an EU-led operation, authorized by the UN Security Council, followed by a UN peacekeeping operation” – (also called “INTERFET model”⁴⁸). This scenario helps the UN to prepare for a longer-term mission or helps it deploy more rapidly a security presence in a country engulfed by crisis. Cooperation between the EU and the UN takes place in the transition period between the two operations. Ideally, this model would imply that the EU keeps an element of a continuous presence on the ground, even after the end of the mandate of its own operation. The EU could (as Australia agreed to do in the case of East Timor) leave some soldiers on the ground and transfer them to the UN as “blue helmets”. This would provide the advantage of a continuous presence, and would give the follow-on UN operation the benefit of the robust position already taken by the EU operation. Thus the deterrence effect from the EU operation would continue into the UN mission. This scenario is the preferred one for the UN, and was partially implemented in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The UN would have only wished that EU soldiers would have stayed longer in the UN mission than a mere three months.

The fourth scenario envisages that the EU provides “a strategic reserve” to a UN peacekeeping operation to strengthen its deterrent capacity, to be able to face any substantial disruption of the security situation. Such a scenario was not initially envisaged in 2000-2001 but became reality with EUFOR RD Congo. The resolution authorising this EU force “over the horizon” could serve as a “model resolution” for future EU-UN deployments (S/RES/1671) as it sets clearly the timeframe of the deployment of the EU, its scope, its mandate, the documents needed to be signed and the reporting.

⁴⁸ ... to illustrate the Australian intervention in September 1999 with an Interim Force in East Timor (INTERFET) to stabilize the security situation in this Indonesian-controlled territory, before handing over a UN mission, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

The fifth scenario, and easiest one in a way, is for the EU Political and Security Committee to play the role of a “clearing house” for UN peacekeeping operations by organising the rotation of national contributions and/or to help build the force generation process. There was an attempt to implement this scenario for the EU to have a coordinated approach to the strengthening of UNIFIL following the adoption of Resolution 1701 in August 2006. A special session of the European Council was held on 25 August 2006, but failed to bring any coherence to European contributions to UNIFIL. Furthermore, the UN has its own force generation process with meetings for potential troop-contributing countries, and does not in fact really need such a “clearing system” on the part of the EU.

The last scenario that could be studied in the military aspects of crisis management and that is already envisaged in the civilian sphere is: “Placing an EU generated force component operating under an EU Flag within a UN Force”. Such scenario has always been rejected by the EU that wishes to retain the strategic control of its chain of command. However, Ireland has recently suggested in a non-paper to the PSC that to “go beyond separate EU-led and UN-led missions to the concept of EU force components forming an integral component of a UN blue helmet operation”. Such scenario happened in Haiti after the earthquake of January 2010 and as MINUSTAH⁴⁹ requested the strengthening of its police component. The option of an EU autonomous operation was quickly put aside because the UN Secretariat specifically said that for better efficiency, MINUSTAH needed to remain in the coordination lead of all efforts of the international community. The solution found by the EU to be visible was therefore that the “gendarmes” deployed had to wear an EU badge in addition to their national flag. Such a scenario could be applied for military components and could

⁴⁹ United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), established in April 2004 by Security Council Resolution 1542.

be a suitably way for EU member states to cautiously reinvest in UN peacekeeping. Such deployment would of course be subject to certain rules (force protection, rules of engagement, reporting). Until now, such a scenario has been considered by EU member states and institutions as too unrealistic.

One way or another, all scenarios have been tried whether in the military or the civilian aspects of crisis management. The circumstances dictated the occurrence of such or such type of deployment and operation. These were in fact test cases that were taken one by one without any clear strategic vision or outcome to achieve, except to develop and advance the EU's Common Defence and Security Policy. Do we need a fundamental review of such mechanisms or is it sufficient to continue as we are? Both organisations should now reflect on their past joint experiences and urgently need to rethink prospects for more effective ways ahead. Are there scenarios likely to be repeated? Should some of them be favoured? Would this relationship be more functional by focusing on niche areas, comparative expertise and a clear division of labour?

Capacity-building and Field-support: An unexplored Area for UN-EU Cooperation

Other possibilities and scenarios exist for cooperation between the UN and the EU in peacekeeping: it concerns capacity-building or utilizing niche capacities in the area of logistics, equipment and training. This is what the EU attempted to do in supporting AMIS in Darfur (2005-2007). For more than two years, the EU made available equipment and assets, provided planning and technical assistance and sent out military observers. It trained African troops, helped with tactical and strategic transportation and provided police assistance and training. The EU could contribute to the setting up of operational headquarters of a UN peacekeeping operation as the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG) did for the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea

(“UNMEE model”).⁵⁰ This scenario poses the problem of EU control of its components within a UN-led operation. To counter this problem, the EU could send deployable headquarters as an entity or operation separate from the UN mission. Such a scenario remains theoretical as long as the EU does not have any permanent operations headquarters itself. Finally, the EU could provide to the UN specific capabilities (such as planning capacities) in the preparation of operations. EU-UN cooperation can also be developed on norms, concepts and procedures, rules of engagement, lessons learned, training criteria, legal aspects, and exchange of liaison officers. The EU could help the UN in making its standards and procedures operable, compatible with those of the Europeans. The EU and the UN could establish common criteria for selecting equipment and develop common training modules for peacekeeping, crisis management, and policing. In the context of UN efforts to develop civilian capacities⁵¹, both institutions could also share their rosters for deploying civilian and specialized personnel in mission areas.

The “New Horizon” paper (July 2009) of the UN Secretariat on reforms in peacekeeping put forward the need for a “Capability-driven approach” in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of UN operations in the field.⁵² It also identified a number of UN critical shortages in mobility

⁵⁰ For more information on SHIRBRIG, see the GGI Research & Advice Project on http://www.globalgovernance.eu/index.php/research-and-advice-clusters/shirbrig_future.html as well as Joachim A. Koops (2009) Effective Inter-organizationalism? Lessons Learned from the Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG), in Joachim A. Koops (ed.) Military Crisis Management: The Challenge of Inter-organizationalism, Special Issue of *Studia Diplomatica*, 62, (3).

⁵¹ See A/65/747 – S/2011/85 (22 February 2011): Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group on “Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict”.

⁵² A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/newhorizon.shtml>. See also Breidlid, Ingrid Marie/de Coning, Cedric H./Jovin Rebecca/PK Singh, 2011, Conference Proceedings: Report of the Conference on Peacekeeping Vision 2015 Capabilities for Future Mandates, New Delhi, *NUPI Report* n°6.

(strategic airlift, utility and tactical helicopters, infantry with high mobility vehicles), enablers (engineers, logistics and transportation units), information-gathering (observation/surveillance, including high resolution, night operations capability, data management and analysis), formed police units (specialized in public order management, including crowd control), specialized police (including trainers, organisational reform experts and investigators), civilian specialists (including in security sector reform, judicial and prisons management), strategic planners (military, police and civilian), as well as female and francophone military and police officers. The EU could work on this list and identify areas where it could help the UN. The UN paper recommends to “intensify dialogue with relevant regional organisations to put in place framework arrangements for reimbursement and logistics support, as well as to examine the feasibility of pooling strategic capabilities”. The EU could work on enabling support to UN Troop and police Contributing Countries (training, in particular to African battalions, funding, provision of equipment, strategic transport).

Strengthening UN-EU Cooperation in Multidimensional Peacekeeping

Other areas of cooperation could also be explored if the two institutions wish to work together in multidimensional peacekeeping. Such cooperation can be envisaged as parallel operations are being deployed, each fulfilling a specific and limited task. This is what the EU had done in DRC for example where it has deployed a Security Sector Reform mission with the aim of implementing the Congolese revised reform plan for the Congolese Armed Forces and to translate it into concrete actions. The EU is leading useful initiatives in the DRC, but the impact is slow and the visibility limited. The same comment could be made for EUPOL Kinshasa. The visibility of these EU missions could have been greater if they were better coordinated with the overall action of MONUC in SSR where it was

given a coordinating role by the UN Security Council.

Another way of enhancing cooperation could be to develop an “action plan”, identifying particular aspects where the two organisations would want to focus co-operation on multidimensional aspects of peacekeeping operations. Such a plan should put emphasis on practical cooperation and the maintenance of a maximum of flexibility, also in order to respect the priorities of each side. More concretely such a plan could comprise the following elements (list that is not exhaustive)⁵³:

- Identification of potential areas for common approach (e.g. DDR, SSR, Human rights).
- Development of common modules relating to training and education on specific thematic questions (DDR, SSR, Human rights).
- Exchange lessons and experience in the field of SSR and, in situations where both organisations are engaged, reinforce efforts to define their respective roles in order to achieve greater complementarity and coherence. Furthermore, identify SSR points of contact in the EU and UN; and develop joint training in the field of SSR.
- Foster cooperation and common approaches in the field of respect of human rights in the context of peacekeeping operations, including children in armed conflict.
- Foster cooperation and common approaches in the field of gender mainstreaming.
- Explore possibilities for enhancing police co-operation.
- Exchange of information on developing capabilities in multi-dimensional aspects of peace-keeping.

⁵³ General Secretariat of the Council, “Recommendations for the Implementation of the Joint statement on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management”, 17 October 2007 and 28 July 2008.

- Identification of possibilities for providing Expert teams to be deployed at short notice.
- In the framework of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, improve European coordination between EU missions to the UN, and in countries on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda.
- Explore the possibility of cooperation in the transition from post-conflict to peacebuilding.⁵⁴

In certain areas such as SSR that require the pooling of multiple expertise, the idea of “SSR Houses” could be promoted, where all capacities, expertise and resources of the different institutions would be gathered.⁵⁵

Conclusions

The UN-EU Cooperation is one of the most advanced cooperation schemes between the UN and a regional organisation. It covers the whole spectrum of crisis management (crisis management, peace-building, development, humanitarian relief, political cooperation). Together, the two organisations are doing a lot to “improve lives”.⁵⁶ Their cooperation even tends to become a model, in particular for NATO that had formalised its cooperation with the UN through a joint declaration in 2008.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ On 25 September 2008, the UN, EC, and World Bank signed a Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning. The Declaration establishes a common platform to mobilize the three institutions and their resources to harmonise and coordinate post-crisis response frameworks to enhance country resilience to crises, by answering recovery needs of vulnerable populations and strengthening the capacity of national institutions for effective prevention, response and recovery

⁵⁵ See article of Frank Neisse on this idea applied to Kosovo, “Communauté internationale et réforme de la sécurité au Kosovo”, *Annuaire français de relations internationales*, volume XI, 2010.

⁵⁶ See the yearly UN-EU Publication, “Improving Lives – Results of the partnership between the United Nations and the European Union in 2009”, June 2010, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/documents/en/100607_Improving_Lives_2009.pdf

⁵⁷ The development of UN-NATO relations is in fact older than the UN-UE one, as it started in the 1990s with UNPROFOR and led to the recent establishment of a NATO Liaison Office to the UN in New York. For further details of the prospects of that cooperation, see Smith-Windsor, Brooke/Vahlas, Alexis/Harsch, Michael F., 2011,

This cooperation has been mainly “UN-driven”, as the UN always took the initiative of asking the EU for support, starting with Artemis. But the EU also found an interest in such development. Indeed, in most part, as Richard Gowan rightly put it, “it is hard to imagine ESDP having got anything like as far as it has without the UN as a partner”.⁵⁸ The UN Secretariat went through three successive states of mind about its relationship with the EU. After initial worries on whether ESDP/CSDP would divert potential European contributions from UN peacekeeping to EU-centric efforts⁵⁹, UN officials thought that the EU could become a reliable burden-sharing partner in peacekeeping. Now, they find that it is a difficult partner that had its own constraints and internal turf wars and that is only reliable when its interests are at stake. They perceive this relation as unequal: “If, to put it bluntly, the EU does crisis management where, when and how it wishes while the UN does what others do not want to do, wherever and whenever, then the UN-EU relationship does not develop on a sound basis”.⁶⁰ Moreover, on the EU side, member states are uncomfortable with the UN command and control feature. The EU is currently preoccupied with its own institutional development (especially since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty), and the UN is too often used only as a global and rhetorical reference. Even if both organisations share the same political goals and comprehensive approach to crisis management, their political decision-making structures, their procedures for planning and implementation of operations as well as their logistical and administrative support procedures are very different. As Thierry

The UN and NATO: Forward from the Joint Declaration; Forum Paper n 17.

⁵⁸ Gowan, Richard, 2008, “The EU still needs UN peacekeepers”, *The EU Observer*: <http://euobserver.com/13/26183>

⁵⁹ In July 2001, Austria and Ireland made statements saying that their commitment to ESDP could hamper them in contributing to UN peacekeeping. The Austrians then withdrew their personnel from UNFICYP.

⁶⁰ Tardy, Thierry, 2009, “UN-EU Relations in Military Crisis Management: Institutionalization and Key Constraints”, *Studia Diplomatica*, vol LXII, n°3, p. 48.

Tardy put it, “the UN-EU relationship is complicated by a general lack of communication or mutual understanding of the respective structures, working methods and institutional cultures.”⁶¹ This creates frustration and lack of understanding between the two secretariats and also explains the current stalemate. Overall, it reveals that the EU is less reliable as a partner for the UN than most EU presidencies and the overall EU rhetoric make it out to be. But still: EU-UN cooperation remains to be what member states of respective organisations continue to aspire to - within certain limits.

However, inter-organizational cooperation needs to be revitalised if it is to be more effective and sustained on the long run. That could be done through a triangular cooperation with the African Union in the field of the development of AU crisis management capabilities. But this “triangular relationship is still in the process of being defined, in terms of objectives, division of labour, and modalities”.⁶² It could also be done with a stronger focus on political dialogue and coordination, on giving more substance to more regular UN-EU meetings. This all requires first and foremost the political will of UN and EU membership and a shared vision for a clear common interest in sharing the burden of crisis management.

GGI Recommendations

Despite some remarkable progress and achievements in UN-EU Relations, a sustained scheme for improving the effectiveness and relevance of the partnership needs to be advanced.

Recommendations to the European Union and the United Nations

- Development of guidelines for coordination in theatre (for EU and UN with regional organisations);
- Identification of potential areas for common approach (e.g. DDR, SSR, Human Rights).
- Development of common modules relating to training and education on specific thematic questions (DDR, SSR, Human Rights).
- Exchange lessons and experience in the field of SSR and, in situations where both organisations are engaged, reinforce efforts to define their respective roles in order to achieve greater complementarity and coherence. Furthermore, identify SSR points of contact in the EU and UN; and develop joint training in the field of SSR.
- Foster cooperation and common approaches in the field of respect of human rights in the context of peacekeeping operations, including children in armed conflict.
- Explore possibilities for enhancing police co-operation.
- Identification of possibilities for providing Expert teams to be deployed at short notice.
- In the framework of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, improve European coordination between EU missions to the UN, and in countries on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda.
- Design and conduct joint training exercises.
- Send Liaison officers at UN/ EU and institutionalise a staff exchange programmes and career tracks for administrators in Peacekeeping/ Crisis Management that are of European nationality, but working for the United Nations.
- Explore the possibility of cooperation in the transition from post-conflict to peacebuilding.⁶³

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁶² See Report “The European Union in Africa: A Strategic Partner in Peace Operations”, Seminar organized jointly by the International Peace Academy and the GCSP, July 2006, p.12.

⁶³ On 25 September 2008, the UN, EC, and World Bank signed a Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning. The Declaration establishes a common platform to mobilize the three institutions and their resources to harmonise and coordinate post-crisis response frameworks to enhance country resilience to crises, by

- Strengthen the role of the UN-EU Steering Committee
- Explore options for Rapid Reaction Mechanisms (drawing on the lessons learned from SHIRBIRG)

Recommendations to the European Union

- Set clear targets of EU deployment to UN operations
- Define the support roles the EU can give to the United Nations, in addition to crisis management.
- Align EU country strategy papers with the United Nations or at least enter a constructive dialogue on differences
- Give the UN access to EU and national rosters
- Establish a joint follow-up commission to the CIVCAP review with a ten-point action plan for the UN but with an additional section singling out action points for the EU, the AU as well as other regional organisations.⁶⁴

answering recovery needs of vulnerable populations and strengthening the capacity of national institutions for effective prevention, response and recovery.

⁶⁴ United Nations 2011: *A/65/747- S/2011/85 Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group, 22 February 2011*. New York: United Nations. <http://civcapreview.org/>

Annex 1: Major stages of the institutionalization of the UN-EU cooperation

Date	Presidency	Documents	Cooperation Steps
1 st Semester 2000	Portuguese Presidency – Feira	Presidency report on strengthening CFSP	<i>“(…) the importance has been underlined of ensuring an extensive relationship in crisis management by the Union between the military and civilian fields, as well as cooperation between the EU rapidly-evolving crisis management capacity and the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe.”</i>
2 nd Semester 2000	French Presidency – Nice	October – December – Presidency report on strengthening CFSP	The SG/HR and the Presidency and the EU Troika meet for the first time with the UN Secretary-General who submitted a proposal for closer cooperation (such as creating working groups on various themes). The French presidency asks the following presidency to work on the <i>“identification of possible areas as well as modalities of cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union in crisis management”</i> .
1 st Semester 2001	Swedish Presidency – Göteborg	Presidency Conclusions to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy	<i>“Important decisions have been taken by the Council to reinforce the political dialogue and strengthen cooperation between the European Union and the UN. Substantial progress has been made in building an effective partnership with the UN in the fields of conflict prevention and crisis management as well as development cooperation, humanitarian affairs, asylum policies and refugee assistance. This partnership is further strengthened by the mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention and by ensuring that the European Union’s evolving military and civilian capacities provide real added value for UN crisis management activities. The Western Balkans, the Middle East and Africa will be given highest priority in this reinforced cooperation. The conclusion of framework agreements between the European Community and relevant UN organisations will enhance cooperation.”</i> + Annex V of the Presidency Report on “EU-UN Cooperation in Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management”
May 2001	Swedish Presidency	A mission of the EU General Secretariat first met with UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) officials	
2 nd Semester 2001	Belgium Presidency – Laeken	Presidency Conclusions	At the European Summit of Laeken, <i>“the Union has begun to cooperate more fully with the United Nations in crisis management and conflict prevention concerning the themes and in the specific areas endorsed by the Gothenburg European Council. Regular contacts at different levels with the representatives of the United Nations have made it possible to keep up the necessary links on the main subjects of common interest. Those contacts have also led to examination, on the basis of the principles and procedures established, of how the development of European capabilities in the ESDP could contribute to United Nations efforts in peacekeeping operations”</i> .
January 2003	Greek Presidency	Establishment of the “Steering Committee”	
2 nd Semester 2003	Italian Presidency	Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management	<i>“The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union welcome the existing co-operation between the United Nations and the European Union in the area of civilian and military crisis management, in particular in the Balkans and in Africa. In order to deepen this co-operation and provide it with reliable and sustainable mechanisms, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union have agreed to the following joint Declaration”</i> .
8 December 2003	Italian Presidency	General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels	<i>“(…) The EU’s dynamic role in UN affairs should be further developed and become commensurate with its present and future contribution in light of the enlargement of the Union. This role should be conducive effective multilateralism by building upon the EU contribution made so far to UN activities. In order to help the multilateral system to deliver on its core objectives, the Council reaffirms the EU’s will to improve cooperation with the UN in areas where its contribution may have significant added</i>

Date	Presidency	Documents	Cooperation Steps
			<i>value for UN activities. (...) Further efforts should be made to raise [the EU's] profile in all the components of a comprehensive approach to peace, security and development, which are interrelated: conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. (...)</i>
12-13 December 2003	Italian Presidency	Brussels European Council – Presidency Conclusions	<i>“The European Council welcomes the conclusions of the GAERC on 8 December 2003 on EUUN relations and stresses the need for these conclusions, as well as the Joint Declaration on crisis management, to be translated into operative action.”</i>
June 2004	Irish Presidency	Adopted by the European Council	EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management operations – Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration <i>“At this stage, two main options can be identified: provision of national military capabilities in the framework of a UN operation, or an EU operation in answer to a request from the UN”. (...) “An in-depth knowledge of each others’ procedures, concept and structures would facilitate cooperation between the two organisations in military crisis management.”</i>
June 2007	German Presidency	Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management	<i>“Noting our mutual commitment to an international order based on effective multilateralism, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union reaffirm their determination to work together in the area of crisis management”.</i>
December 2008	French Presidency	Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council	<i>“The European Council states the Union's determination to continue its support for the United Nations and for the efforts made by regional security organisations, including the African Union, to promote international peace and security.”</i>
December 2009	Swedish Presidency	With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Commission's delegation to the UN and the Liaison Office of the General Secretariat of the Council merged to become the European Union Delegation.	

Annex 2: Operations involving UN-EU cooperation since 2003

Date	Name & Place	Resolution Joint Action	UN-EU Cooperation	Mandate of the UN Security Council or of the European Council
March-December 2003	“ Operation Concordia ”, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)	S/RES/1484 (30-05-2003) Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP (27-01-2003)	<i>No authorization by the Security Council</i> <u>Stand alone operation</u>	At the explicit request of the FYROM government, to contribute further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. <i>Based on arrangements with NATO and subject to a further decision by the Council, as specified in Article 3, the European Union shall conduct a European Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, at the request of the FYROM government, in order to ensure the follow-on to the NATO operation ‘Allied Harmony’.</i>
May 2003	“ Operation Artemis ”, Ituri, Democratic Republic of the Congo	S/RES/1484 (30-05-2003) Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP (05-06-2003)	Authorization of the UN Security Council <u>Bridging Operation</u> (to a reinforcement of MONUC in Ituri)	<i>Authorizes the deployment until 1 September 2003 of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia in close coordination with MONUC, in particular its contingent currently deployed in the town, to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town</i>
Since January 2003	EU Police Mission (EUPM) , Bosnia-Herzegovina	S/RES/1396 (05-03-2002) S/RES/1423 (12-07-2002) Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP (11-03-2002)	<i>No formal authorization by the Security Council</i> <u>Follow-on civilian mission</u>	<i>Welcomes the decision of the European Union (EU) to send a Police Mission (EUPM) to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1 January 2003 as well as the close coordination between the European Union, UNMIBH and the High Representative to ensure a seamless transition and the invitation of the EU to non-EU member States to participate in the EUPM</i>
Since November 2004	“ Operation Althea ”, Bosnia-Herzegovina	S/RES/1575 (22-11-2004)	Authorization of the UN Security Council <u>Parallel operation</u> Overall coordination with EU Police Mission and the Office of the High Commissioner	<i>Authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the EU to establish for an initial planned period of 12 months a multinational stabilization force (EUFOR) as a legal successor to SFOR under unified command and control, which will fulfil its missions in relation to the implementation of Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement in cooperation with the NATO HQ presence in accordance with the arrangements agreed between NATO and the EU as communicated to the Security Council in their letters of 19 November 2004, which recognize that the EUFOR will have the main peace stabilization role under the military aspects of the Peace Agreement.</i>
2005-2007	“ AMIS EU Supporting Action ”, Darfur, Sudan	Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP (18-07-2005)	<u>Support mission</u> to AU before the handover to a UN operation (UNAMID)	Establishes an EU civilian-military action to support the African Union’s enhanced Mission to AMIS, at the request of the African Union
Since May 2005	EUSEC DRC , Democratic Republic of the Congo	Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP (02-05-2005)	<u>Parallel mission</u> Overall coordination with MONUC on SSR	<i>Establishes a mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) called EUSEC DR Congo with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the army in the DRC. The mission shall aim, in close cooperation and coordination with the other actors in the international community, to provide practical support for the integration of the Congolese army and good governance in the field of security (...).</i>
August-November 2006	Eufor RDCongo , Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo	S/RES/1671 (25-04-2006) Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP (27-04-2006)	Authorization of the UN Security Council <u>Stand-by / Over the Horizon</u>	<i>Authorizes, for a period ending four months after the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections, the deployment of Eufor RDCongo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Decides that Eufor RDCongo is authorized to take all necessary measures, within its means and capabilities, to</i>

				<p>carry out the following tasks, in accordance with the agreement to be reached between the European Union and the United Nations: (a) to support MONUC to stabilize a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities, (b) to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (c) to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa, (d) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of Eufor RDCongo, (e) to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger.</p>
Since May 2007	EU Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan	Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP of 30 May 2007	<p><u>Parallel mission</u></p> <p>Overall coordination with UNAMA & ISAF</p>	<p>EUPOL AFGHANISTAN shall significantly contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements, which will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system, in keeping with the policy advice and institution building work of the Community, Member States and other international actors. Further the Mission will support the reform process towards a trusted and efficient police service, which works in accordance with international standards, within the framework of the rule of law and respects human rights.</p>
Since June 2007	EUPOL Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo	Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP (12-06-2007)	<p><u>Parallel operation</u></p> <p>Overall coordination with MONUC on SSR</p>	<p>Conducts a police mission in Kinshasa (DRC) in order to monitor, mentor, and advise the setting up and the initial running of the IPU in order to ensure that the IPU acts following the training received in the Academy Centre and according to international best practices in this field. These actions shall be focused on the IPU chain of command to enhance the management capability of the IPU and to monitor, mentor and advise the operational Units in the execution of its tasks.</p>
Since February 2008	EULEX Kosovo	Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP (04-02-2008)	<p><u>Parallel mission</u></p> <p>Overall reference to S/RES/1244 (1999) but the failure of negotiations in the Council prevented EULEX from being formally authorized by the UN.</p> <p>Overall coordination with UNMIK</p>	<p>EULEX KOSOVO shall assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and European best practices.</p> <p>EULEX KOSOVO, in full cooperation with the European Commission Assistance Programmes, shall fulfil its mandate through monitoring, mentoring and advising, while retaining certain executive responsibilities.</p>
Since February 2008	EU mission in support of the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau)	Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP (12-02-2008)	<p><u>Parallel operation</u></p> <p>Overall coordination with BINUB on SSR</p>	<p>EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU shall provide local authorities with advice and assistance on SSR in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy, in close cooperation with other EU, international and bilateral actors, and with a view to facilitating subsequent donor engagement</p>
March 2008-2009	Eufor Chad/CAR, Eastern Chad & North West of CAR	<p>S/RES/1778 (25-09-2007)</p> <p>Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP (15-10-2007)</p>	<p>Authorization of the UN Security Council</p> <p><u>Bridging Operation</u></p>	<p>Authorizes the European Union to deploy, for a period of one year from the date that its initial operating capability is declared by the European Union in consultation with the Secretary-General, an operation aimed at supporting [MINURCAT], and decides that this operation shall be authorized to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operation in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, to fulfil the following functions (...): (i) To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced</p>

				<p>persons; (ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations; (iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel</p>
Since September 2008	EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), Georgia	Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP (15-09-2008)	<p><u>Parallel mission</u></p> <p>Overall coordination with UNOMIG (ended on 30th June 2009)</p>	<p><i>EUMM Georgia shall provide civilian monitoring of Parties' actions, including full compliance with the six-point Agreement and subsequent implementing measures throughout Georgia, working in close coordination with partners, particularly the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and consistent with other EU activity, in order to contribute to stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building whilst also contributing to informing European policy in support of a durable political solution for Georgia. The particular objectives of the Mission shall be: (a) to contribute to long-term stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding region; (b) in the short term, the stabilisation of the situation with a reduced risk of a resumption of hostilities, in full compliance with the six-point Agreement and the subsequent implementing measures.</i></p>
Since December 2008	Operation Atalanta-EUNAVFOR, Somalia	S/RES/1846 (02-12-2008) Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (10-11-2008)	<p><u>Parallel mission</u></p> <p>Overall coordination with the World Food Programme</p>	<p><i>Welcomes initiatives (...) by regional and international organizations to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia pursuant to resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008), (...) in particular the decision by the EU on 10 November 2008 to launch, for a period of 12 months from December 2008, a naval operation to protect WFP maritime convoys bringing humanitarian assistance to Somalia and other vulnerable ships, and to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.</i></p>
Since January 2010	EUTM Somalia	S/RES/1872 (26-05-2009) Decision 2010/96/CFSP (15-02-2010)	<p><u>Parallel mission</u></p> <p>Overall coordination with the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and AMISOM (African Union)</p>	<p><i>Urges Member States, regional and international organizations to contribute generously to the United Nations Trust Fund for the Somali security institutions, and to offer technical assistance for the training and equipping of the Somali security forces, consistent with paragraphs 11 (b) and 12 of resolution 1772 (2007).</i></p> <p><i>The Union shall conduct a military training mission, hereinafter called 'EUTM Somalia', in order to contribute to strengthening the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as a functioning government serving the Somali citizens. In particular, the objective of the EU military mission shall be to contribute to a comprehensive and sustainable perspective for the development of the Somali security sector by strengthening the Somali security forces through the provision of specific military training, and support to the training provided by Uganda, of 2 000 Somali recruits up to and including platoon level, including appropriate modular and specialised training for officers and non-commissioned officers. The EU military mission shall operate in close cooperation and coordination with other actors in the international community, in particular, the United Nations, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the United States of America.</i></p>

About the Global Governance Institute

The Global Governance Institute (GGI) is an independent, non-profit think tank based in Brussels. GGI brings together policy-makers, scholars and practitioners from the world's leading institutions in order to devise, strengthen and improve forward-looking approaches to global governance.

Our core research areas are:

- Peace & Security
- Global Justice (including International Law & Human Rights)
- Environment & Sustainable Development
- Economic Policy
- Forward Studies & Innovation

Our Mission

Our mission is to promote comprehensive research, cutting-edge analysis and innovative advice on core policy issues, informed by a truly global perspective. This also includes raising awareness about major challenges of global governance among the general public.

Our Vision

Our vision is a more equitable, peaceful and sustainable global order based on effective but accountable international organizations, the global rule of law and the empowerment of the individual across borders and cultures. GGI places particular emphasis on the improvement of the United Nations system and its mutual reinforcement with strong regional organizations.

For further information and enquiries, contact us at info@globalgovernance.eu or visit us at www.globalgovernance.eu



The Global Governance Institute (GGI) v.z.w./a.s.b.l. is a non-profit foundation registered under Belgian law. Registration No. 831.178.152