Before the Peace Summit: Testing Multilateralism and Ukrainian Diplomacy

Commentary
14
June 2024

The long-awaited Peace Summit to explore the possibilities of resolving the Russia-Ukraine war will take place in Switzerland on the 15th-16th of June. The Peace Summit is the result of the Ukrainian government’s intensive diplomatic campaign for gathering support for its vision of long and enduring peace based on the United Nations Charter, international law, and justice. The Summit is expected to discuss the Ukrainian Peace Formula (UPF), introduced by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who articulated Ukraine’s perspective on the political-diplomatic settlement that could become a solution to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Specifically, this first global engagement to put an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will touch on the three UPF provisions: food security, nuclear safety, and the release of all prisoners of war (POWs) and deportees. Ukraine has invested significant and sustained diplomatic efforts for making this summit a reality in order to garner further support and to bring as many states as possible to the negotiating table. Initially backed by Ukraine’s traditional partners such as the EU and G7 nations, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and others, several countries of the so-called Global South have signalled their intention to take part in the Peace Summit.

The UPF not only tries to propose a basic framework to solve the Russia-Ukraine conflict but also aspires to influence wider conversations on global governance reform and institutional approaches to international peace and security. The Ukrainian President is advocating for the UPF’s chief role in preventing violent conflicts and military aggressions globally. However, given the complexity of the issue, mounting threats and increasing uncertainty on the battlefield of the Russia-Ukraine war, as well as a tense geopolitical situation across the globe fuelled by multiple conflicts, local elections in numerous states this year, and the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, the Ukraine Peace Summit can also be seen as a test for multilateralism. Even before the Summit has begun, there are already concerns about its potential success at a time when many countries are trying to remain neutral and maintain the current state of their relationships with Russia, Ukraine, and other nations. Additionally, there are proposals for various amendments to the diplomatic process, some of which may not be suitable or even destructive, thus limiting possibilities of arranging just and enduring peace acceptable for Ukraine.

Participants of the Peace Summit: Managing a Wider Global Engagement in Switzerland Faces Setbacks

Prior to this Peace Summit, Ukraine advanced a sustained outreach campaign through a series of consecutive international meetings of national security and foreign policy advisors in Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Malta, and Switzerland. Through these meetings, states could examine and decide on the key principles of ending the Russia-Ukraine war and engage in exchanges of opinions on the UPF itself. As a result, those meetings involved more than 80 states in negotiations, including countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While demonstrating overall positive dynamics in terms of engaging as many states as possible and highlighting that Ukraine and the West are not just inclined to resolve this war by military means, it also signals to the international community that there is space for diplomacy. This counters Russia’s propaganda and Putin’s claims that Ukraine and the West refuse to negotiate.

Hence, due to these diplomatic activities, around 107 states have confirmed their participation in the Peace Summit thus far. As the hosting state, Switzerland has invited 160 delegates of states and representatives of international organizations, such as the UN, OSCE, and Council of Europe, to the Summit at Ukraine's request. The number of participants will likely fluctuate before the Summit’s commencement. Given the complexity and sensitivity of the negotiation subject, it is no wonder the Ukrainian President tries to secure broader participation, also underlined by Zelenskyy’s recent visit to Asia. He participated in the Shangri-La Dialogue conference, dedicated to discussing defence and security issues. He also met with some Asian leaders and partners in the region to ensure their participation in the Peace Summit, including the President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Amir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, José Ramos-Horta, President-elect of Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto, as well as President of Singapore, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, and Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Lawrence Wong. All these meetings focused on discussing the UPF and these states’ participation in the Peace Summit.

Yet, the peace summit faces already challenges before it has even begun. News that various states, who are critical to the negotiations (considering their size and power in international politics) will not join the summit has had a sobering effect. The most prominent case is China, which, despite initially participating in the Jeddah meeting to discuss the UPF and agreeing that any peace agreement should respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity under the UN Charter, has refused to attend the Summit. China cited the need to have both Ukraine and Russia at the negotiating table. Yet, Ukraine had stressed since the beginning that Russian representatives would not be invited to the first Peace Summit (arguing that Russia would sabotage the discussions). The position remains that Russia can be invited in the future on the condition that their delegation is willing to negotiate in good faith, bearing in mind that multiple Summits are envisaged since the first one will discuss only three provisions of the UPF out of ten.

China’s diplomatic role in the Russia-Ukraine war is becoming increasingly questionable, reducing the likelihood of Beijing gaining trust as a potential peace broker at a time when China is becoming more supportive of Russia diplomatically, economically, and ideologically. On top of that are accusations from Western intelligence that Beijing is or will be providing lethal weapons to Russia. Zelenskyy also accused China and Russia of sabotaging and undermining the Peace Summit. Official statements from China’s MFA spokesperson - such as the official position that China’s non-participation would not mean that it does not support peace- are becoming increasingly vacuous. There are also indications that Russia, on its part, has tried to use  economic coercion and diplomatic pressure on Global South states to withdraw their participation by instrumentalizing the threat of a blockade of agricultural goods, food, and chemical product supplies.

Next to China, other signs indicate that more states were doubtful about their participation in the Peace Summit, including Saudi Arabia, which put forward the same line as China—that it does not want to participate without Russia’s presence. However, it will still take part in the summit.  Pakistan’s non-participation in the Summit “to maintain neutrality.” is also an indicator that states from the region are hedging their bets. At the Latin American front, the future participation of Brazil also seems unclear, as President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is not expected to attend the Summit even though a lower-ranking Brazilian diplomatic delegation might participate in the Summit. The President of Argentina, Javier Milei, was considered unlikely to participate in the talks due to the national holiday. However, he has since changed his mind and will attend the meeting. Even within the Western ranks, the situation seems less straight-forward than hoped for. The US President Joe Biden will not attend the Peace Summit and will be represented instead by Vice President Kamala Harris and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, highlighting domestic intricacies and the complicating factors of the situation related to the upcoming presidential elections. Hungary  has neither refused nor accepted the invitation but still cited the same reason voiced by China and other states concerning Russia’s non-participation.

A day before the summit,  Russia’s president Putin outlined his own vision of the path towards peace, urging the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions as a pre-conditions for negotiations as well as Ukraine's refusal to join NATO. This is a clear signal of Russia's maximalist goals and a sign that it is not considering the withdrawal of its own troops, but rather serves as an indication that the Kremlin is still seeking territorial gains. Putin’s timing of his ‘proposals’ just before the summit is also an indication of his diplomatic campaign to  undermine the work of the summit, to sow fragmentation and seeking to shape the position of Global South states.

Threats of Declining Participation and Diplomatic Manoeuvres Regarding the Final Communiqué

The current developments indicate the ongoing challenges faced by the UPF and the uphill diplomatic battle Ukraine’s broader vision for peace still has to engage with. The international community remains highly polarised, and differing arguments related to Russia’s non-invitation serves as an excuse for avoiding tough diplomatic choices, thereby undermining the likelihood of a diplomatic settlement of the Russia-Ukraine war. Next to multilateral summit diplomacy, bilateral negotiations must continue. Indeed, when warring parties have no confidence and trust in each other’s intentions, engaging them separately through different initiatives and by other brokers could bring results. For instance, parallel negotiation tracks could be helpful, as witnessed earlier by brokering the Grain Deal initiative in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. At the same time, apart from the risks of losing several leading powers’ engagement in the Ukraine Peace Summit, other threats could potentially hinder the UPF implementation, including disagreements over the  text of the Summit’s final communiqué.

There have been indications that the text of the final communiqué has been changed and adapted so significantly that it might also undermine some of the core principles of the UPF. For example, sources cite that UPF will not be the only option for the diplomatic settlement, paving the way for proposals that could contradict the UPF directly and Ukrainian interests more specifically. Instead of discussing concrete measures to achieve peace, the final communiqué mentions confidence-building measures (CBMs) between Russia and Ukraine. The draft also omitted the need to liberate and demilitarise the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The demands placed on Russia, such as the liberation of occupied Ukrainian territories and others, in the form of a shared vision produced by the international community, were also lifted. To join the peace negotiations, Russia has to participate in vague CBMs, which might lead to a diplomatic negotiation direction where  only Ukraine has to commit to concessions: firstly, to engage as many states as possible in the peace process, and secondly, to engage with Russia by making cabal concessions that could lead to territorial losses and violation of Ukraine’s internationally recognised borders. The proposed changes to the final text threaten Ukraine’s vital interests  and carry serious risks of directly undermining core principles of the UN Charter. There are now calls inside Ukraine, both amongst diplomatic circles and civil society organisations, to refuse to sign the communiqué of the Peace Summit, if the text opens the doors to directly threaten core pillars of the UPF.

Conclusion

The full implementation of the UPF, as witnessed by the ongoing diplomatic activities around the Russia-Ukraine war, will remain incredibly difficult. While Ukraine’s and the West’s overall strategy of engaging the Global South to end Russia’s invasion is the right decision and is certainly in the spirit of multilateralism, the Peace Summit should not produce counterproductive results that will endanger the Ukrainian vision of just peace. States must work towards achieving peace based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law. It is clear that to end the war, both Russia and Ukraine would have to make certain concessions, but those cannot be at the expense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, international law and global justice. Russia has committed a crime of aggression, is targeting Ukrainian civilians daily, and, as any other aggressor, must pay the price. This also includes justice for the victims of this aggression and punishing those responsible for it.

If the global community is not able to agree on these fundamental principles, then integrating alternative and politicised visions into the peace process will further undermine international law and the rules-based international order and, more dangerously, will create shortcuts for Russia to avoid legal responsibility for its aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, it will inevitably create more tensions and distrust between members of the international community, not to mention alienating Ukraine from any diplomatic activities, especially those where its voice is not heard. It is imperative now for those participating in the Peace Summit and those influencing it (e.g. China) to make it about a just and sustainable peace and not a summit on false equivalences of “reasonable security concerns of both sides.”China's refusal to attend the Summit should not distract Ukraine and its partners to concentrate on engaging other key rising powers, such as India, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and others, while maintaining a steadfast commitment to fundamental international law principles.

Yet, even if the summit will not produce a desired major step forward towards a diplomatic solution of the war just yet, it is vital to not relent on other core goals by formulating concrete proposals on how to, for instance, ensure Russia’s release of POWs and deportees, especially Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia. Much will be at stake at this weekend’s Peace Summit - Ukraine and its partners must continue to resist Russia’s disinformation campaigns and diplomatic sabotage, focus on small but important steps of progress whilst not losing sight of the overarching goal of sustainable peace. It might have to lead to diplomatic flexibility, but should not cross the red lines of international law, the UN Charter and justice for Ukraine.  

Download PDF