The joint strikes by the United States (US) and Israel on Iran’s nuclear facilities last June were intended as a show of force--a final red line, perhaps--to compel the Islamic Republic to reconsider its nuclear ambitions and its destabilizing role in the region. However, several months later, it remains still unclear how effective they were. While some infrastructure has been damaged, much of Iran’s nuclear program is believed to be housed in underground or dispersed sites. While last September the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran concluded an agreement in Cairo to allow inspectors back into the country, the bombed nuclear sites are off limits. After the European troika invoked the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s snapback mechanism, Iran’s foreign minister announced that Tehran now considers the Cairo agreement void. As a consequence, it is hard for the international community to make a reliable analysis of the extent to which the facilities are damaged and what is the status of the nuclear program in Iran. Tehran may retain the capacity to catch up with its pre-strikes enrichment, especially if covert stockpiles or secret facilities were preserved. Crucially, the strikes do not seem to have spurred any willingness by the regime to de-escalate tensions or roll back enrichment toward zero.
If anything, what is unfolding now is a shift not only in capability but also in motivation. The literature on nuclear proliferation, particularly the framework outlined by Van der Meer (2016), emphasizes four drivers behind a state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons: capabilities, national security, domestic politics, and normative beliefs. By that lens, the recent strikes may have strengthened at least two. From a national security perspective, Iran’s leaders are likely to interpret the attack not as effective deterrence, but as proof that only a credible nuclear deterrent can protect the regime from existential threats. Domestically, discourse within regime-aligned conservative circles is shifting; what was once taboo is now being aired publicly, including on national television and social media. The bomb is no longer portrayed as a reckless ambition, but increasingly as a national necessity.
This shift in motivation, however, is colliding with a different reality: the Islamic Republic may no longer be in a position to afford the bomb. Unlike North Korea, Iran lacks both a full totalitarian grip over its society and the kind of reliable geopolitical patron that could insulate it from international pressure. The country is in a deep economic crisis; one of its worst since the revolution of 1979. Sanctions, capital flight, inflation, currency collapse, chronic corruption, and growing signs of energy poverty have pushed the population to the brink. And while some members of the ruling elite embrace the idea of nuclear deterrence, they do so in the context of widespread cynicism and mounting public exhaustion. There is simmering dissent across society: latent but increasingly difficult to contain.
Iran's international position is no less fragile. Hopes that Moscow might offer strategic cover have faded. Russia’s muted response to the 12-day war, despite Tehran’s expectations, has been a sobering reminder that Moscow, preoccupied with Ukraine, will not shield the regime from the consequences of its behavior. China’s support, meanwhile, remains transactional and limited. Tehran is more isolated now than at any point in recent memory.
At the same time, Europe re-engaged in a new attempt to make Iran comply with international safeguards agreements. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom demanded renewed access to all nuclear facilities by IAEA inspectors, a restart of negotiations with the US, and an account of the estimated 400kg stockpile of highly enriched uranium that was documented by the IAEA in May. The Cairo deal did not allow the inspectors to visit the bombed nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan. The lack of progress in meeting the European demands urged Paris, Berlin and London to prepare for reimposing sanctions under the JCPOA’s snapback mechanism. Referring to six UNSC resolutions, the sanctions were reactivated by the UN Security Council on 27 September. Consequently, on 20 November 2025 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted resolution 2025/71 which urges Iran ‘to comply fully and without delay with its legal obligations’ under the six reinstated UNSC resolutions and ‘to extend full and prompt cooperation to the IAEA’.
The resolution was adopted by 19 countries in favour, with 12 abstentions and 3 member states opposing the resolution (China, Russia and Niger). Iran called the resolution ‘illegal and unfounded’ and announced to terminate the Cairo agreement. In the meantime, China and Russia have publicly declared that Iran has fulfilled its JCPOA obligations and that they will resume normal economic relations with Tehran. Their position reflects a broader concern: both countries have been increasingly willing to challenge the post–World War II international order. By treating this case as a test of the system’s limits, Beijing and Moscow appear to be probing how the international community will respond and whether the moment is ripe to advance their vision of an alternative order: one in which they and Global South states play a far more prominent role and govern their economic and political relations independently of Western-founded institutions.
The attempts by China and Russia to change the current world-order should be seen in the light of the wider crisis of the post-1945 multilateral system. Persistent paralysis within the UN Security Council has increasingly pushed states to act outside multilateral frameworks, often invoking contested interpretations of self-defense. While such actions may be politically understandable in light of current security dynamics, some might argue that their cumulative effect risks further weakening the authority of international law and accelerating the erosion of the rules-based international order.
That said, the sanctions in Iran are widely seen as yet another economic shock, involving renewed currency pressure, collapsing investment, deeper isolation for Iran’s already strangled economy, and now even environmental challenges. This is where the situation grows more precarious. If the economic collapse intensifies in the coming months, another wave of protests becomes increasingly likely. Previous rounds of mass dissent have shown just how quickly frustration can erupt, and this time the state’s repressive apparatus, especially the IRGC, has been weakened by external targeting. The line between international crisis and domestic instability is beginning to blur. Some in Washington and Tel Aviv are hoping for this convergence. But if the regime survives a domestic dissent, it may emerge more desperate, more erratic, and more committed to a survival strategy centered around nuclear weapons.
This moment, then, is not simply about Iran’s decision to pursue or forgo a nuclear bomb. It is about the trajectory of a fragile, cornered regime operating under extraordinary pressure, both externally and internally. The strikes may have accelerated Tehran’s motivations, but they have also exposed the regime’s vulnerabilities. Whether this turns into an opportunity to prevent nuclearization, or a prelude to it, depends less on the bombing itself than on what follows in the coming months.
Preventing the Islamic Republic from acquiring nuclear weapons is not just about Iran. It will set the tone for the region. As Klay (2018) argues in “Threat by Example,” the way the international community responds to authoritarian regimes under pressure sends signals far beyond one case. If the Islamic Republic, even under sanctions and mass dissent, is still able to cross the nuclear threshold, the message to others in the region is clear: nuclear ambition is not a red line, but a viable strategic option. This is not just a Middle East concern. With Iran’s long-range missile program advancing, a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic would pose a direct threat to European security. Add to that the risk that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt could be emboldened to pursue similar ambitions.
The question, then, is not just whether the international community can deter Iran from building a bomb. It is whether key actors, particularly in Europe, have an effective strategy for responding to a regime that is not only nuclear-curious, but potentially approaching political collapse. The window for strategic clarity may be narrow. But it is still open.
**Babak Rezaeedaryakenari is Senior Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Institute of Political Science, Leiden University
