Nuclear energy has traditionally been excluded from the focus of major Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and many national governments. Concerns over high construction costs, long implementation periods, safety risks, and the unresolved issue of nuclear waste management led most international financial institutions to prioritise renewable energy sources and energy efficiency projects. However, this position has changed considerably in recent years. Growing concerns about energy security, exacerbated by geopolitical shocks such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and escalating tensions in the Middle East, have highlighted the vulnerabilities associated with dependence on fossil fuel imports and unstable energy markets. These developments have contributed to a broader reassessment of nuclear energy's role within national energy strategies and international development finance.
At COP28 in Dubai in 2023, 25 countries adopted the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy, which recognises the key role of nuclear energy in achieving global net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and calls on “shareholders of the World Bank, international financial institutions, and regional development banks to encourage the inclusion of nuclear energy in their organizations’ energy lending policies.” Currently, 38 countries are the signatories of this Declaration, including four New Development Bank member countries: Brazil, China, South Africa and the UAE.
Support for nuclear energy has also grown within Europe. Although the European Union has historically been divided on the role of nuclear power in the energy transition, recent concerns regarding energy security, industrial competitiveness, and decarbonisation have strengthened the position of pro-nuclear member states. France has been the leading advocate of nuclear energy within the EU, consistently promoting its recognition as a low-carbon technology and supporting greater access to public and private financing for nuclear projects. Other member states, including Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, have increasingly embraced nuclear energy as part of their long-term energy strategies.
The changing attitudes of major shareholders have also influenced the policies of multilateral development banks. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have already adapted their strategies to address these evolving priorities. In 2025, both institutions lifted longstanding restrictions on financing nuclear energy projects. Other organisations, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the European Investment Bank, have likewise signalled a growing openness towards the sector. While the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank's current Energy Sector Strategy continues to exclude direct financing for nuclear power generation, the Bank signed a letter of intent with the International Atomic Energy Agency in March 2025 to deepen cooperation on nuclear-related issues and explore future opportunities for collaboration. Similarly, the European Investment Bank, which has traditionally focused on renewable energy investments, has become increasingly engaged in discussions concerning the financing of next-generation nuclear technologies, particularly small modular reactors (SMRs), reflecting the broader reassessment of nuclear energy across international financial institutions.
The New Development Bank is often referred to as the BRICS Bank, named after its five founding members, which comprise the original countries in the informal BRICS grouping: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. This organisation, which entered into force in 2015, is the first MDB established by developing countries, primarily aimed at addressing the needs of other developing nations. Initially founded with just five members, the bank has since expanded and now includes ten members: Bangladesh, the UAE, Egypt, Algeria, and Uzbekistan, as well as three prospective members: Uruguay, Colombia, and Ethiopia.
In autumn 2025, in response to the current geopolitical challenges and in light of emerging opportunities, the NDB Board of Directors agreed with the Management proposal and approved the list of guiding principles for extending NDB’s support to nuclear projects, including potential actions to be undertaken by the Bank. At the 11th Annual Meeting of the NDB, held in Moscow in May 2026, the President of the NDB, Dilma Rousseff, acknowledged that: ‘Small modular nuclear reactors associated with the substitution of coal and fossil fuel-fired power plants, for example, may contribute to ensuring a stable and low-carbon energy supply.’ The position was supported in particular by the Governor for Russia to the NDB and Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation, Anton Siluanov, who stated: ‘I welcome the Bank’s decision to begin financing nuclear projects.’
The NDB's embrace of nuclear energy suggests that the Bank is adapting to changing global priorities while, at the same time, not challenging the prevailing development finance paradigm. The crucial question is therefore not whether the NDB will finance nuclear projects, but whether it can do so in a manner that addresses the specific needs of developing countries and differentiates its approach from that of established MDBs. The answer to this question will, once again, provide an important indication of whether the NDB is emerging as a genuine alternative within the multilateral development finance architecture or is increasingly becoming part of the mainstream MDB community.
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