Is South Sudan Ready to Vote? Assessing the Prospects for a Credible Election in December 2026

Introduction: South Sudan’s Electoral Crossroads

South Sudan, the youngest nation in the world, is scheduled to hold its first general election on 22 December 2026. The civil war that engulfed the country after independence has derailed the country’s democratic process. The planned elections were intended under the 2018 peace framework to bring to an end the transitional period that began in 2018 after the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS).¹ Since the confirmation of the elections, the National Elections Commission (NEC) has begun preparations by putting in place electoral structures and organizing civic education at the state level, while also undertaking internal institutional reforms.² Policymakers and observers continue to ask whether the security, legal, and political environment is credible enough for citizens and political actors to participate and to accept the process and its outcome.

The growing uncertainty surrounding the general election stems from the weak implementation of the R-ARCSS, which set clear guidelines to be followed before any general elections. Fighting continues in many parts of the country, and the rule of law and justice mechanisms envisioned by R-ARCSS remain incomplete. The arrest and trial of former First Vice-President Riek Machar, who is also the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), is a serious concern as the election approaches.³ South Sudanese civil society organizations (CSOs) have long demanded that the state implement the R-ARCSS and hold elections, but under current circumstances, many CSOs fear electoral violence, which has also fueled distrust in political institutions and the political process.⁴

The political context in South Sudan took another turn on 22 September 2026, when President Salva Kiir dissolved the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity and relieved all Vice Presidents of their duties, including Machar. The national legislature, state governments, and state legislatures were all dissolved. The president has appointed a caretaker administration, which he is heading, to lead the country until the December elections.⁵ This followed amendments to the electoral framework which removed the permanent constitution and national population census as prerequisites for conducting national elections.⁶

This policy brief examines the South Sudanese aspiration to hold an election and the conditions needed for a credible, inclusive, and peaceful election. The brief asks what minimum political, legal, institutional, and security conditions must be in place for the upcoming December elections to be considered credible and peaceful. A recent visit to Juba while Machar’s trial was ongoing provides contextual grounding, while conversations with CSOs strengthen existing policy literature.

1. Elections as the Promised End of an Unfinished Transition

The 2018 Revitalized Peace Agreement did not envision general elections as a stand-alone event. Elections were meant to be the last phase of the transitional process, setting the foundation for post-conflict reconstruction in South Sudan. The R-ARCSS sought, among many things, to establish a unified security force, a permanent constitution, a functioning electoral system, and a transitional justice system. As such, the planned December 2026 general elections cannot be separated from the R-ARCSS.⁷

Implementation of the R-ARCSS has been very slow, and in 2022, the parties adopted a roadmap that extended the transitional period and moved the general elections to December 2024.⁸ Unfortunately, in September 2024, the transition was extended to February 2027, and the general elections moved to December 2026 because many critical tasks had remained unresolved. The parties justified each extension as additional time needed to complete reforms that will enable a credible transition.⁹

The debate over implementing R-ARCSS shows how far the original sequencing of activities has shifted. In recent years, the government has attempted to amend R-ARCSS to delink the permanent constitution and population census from the upcoming general elections. On 15 January 2026, the national Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs submitted proposed amendments to the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) for its consideration and endorsement, pursuant to Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS. Four of these suggested amendments were substantive, namely: “Article 1.2.5 of the R-ARCSS on TCRSS to delink the Permanent Constitution from the conduct of elections and end the Transition; Article 1.2.14 of the R-ARCSS to repeal the conduct of Population and Housing Census; Article 8.2¹⁰ of the R-ARCSS to delink the R-ARCSS from the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (TCRSS); and Article 8.3 of the R-ARCSS to repeal the Supremacy of the R-ARCSS”. RJMEC stated that “The first two proposals directly relate to the conduct of elections, based on the justifications provided. In contrast, the latter two are broader than just the electoral process and would alter the structure and architecture of the R-ARCSS, undermine the legal basis of the R-ARCSS, thereby abrogating its supremacy, including undermining the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) and the African Union’s (AU) oversight role as the Guarantors”.¹¹ RJMEC argued any amendments to the R-ARCSS should follow the procedure outlined in Article 8.4, and be limited to provisions strictly necessary for free, fair, peaceful, and credible elections.

The debate changed in September 2026 when the electoral framework was amended to remove the completion of the permanent constitution and national census as prerequisites for conducting national elections.¹² This may remove legal and practical obstacles to conducting the election, but it also changes the sequencing envisioned by the peace agreement. The reconfiguration of the institutions through which the R-ARCSS power-sharing agreement had been operated has significantly changed the political context. Just a week before the dissolution, the regional body IGAD reaffirmed R-ARCSS as the “sole viable framework for peace,”¹³ and the December election remained anchored to the peace agreement. The question now is how the institutions established to monitor and implement the agreement will operate under the caretaker administration.

RJMEC has argued that some unfinished reforms can continue after the elections, while others are central to the validity and fairness of the electoral process, such as “security-sector unification, electoral rules, the political rights of parties, civic space and dispute-resolution”.¹⁴ Transitional justice remains incomplete because the Hybrid Court and the Compensation and Reparation Authority, which were supposed to be established, are still pending, even as the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing has made significant progress.¹⁵ The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan continues to document serious human rights concerns, a hostile political atmosphere, the prosecution of political opposition, and armed violence.¹⁶ Accountability is critical to the wider transition process. A CSO representative who spoke on condition of anonymity stated that:

“Many of the clauses of the Revitalized Peace Agreement have not been implemented. This was supposed to be the basis for any general elections.”

Political actors and CSOs in South Sudan are not concerned that every aspect of the R-ARCSS has not been implemented before the general elections; rather, they are asking for clarity on which unfinished provisions are indispensable to a free, fair, and peaceful election and which can legitimately continue after the elections. When R-ARCSS was designed, the general elections were supposed to be the outcome of the transition. But under current circumstances, the risk is that holding general elections becomes a substitute for completing the transition rather than the culmination of it.

This concern has become immediate because of the dissolution of the transitional government. The critical question now is whether the new caretaker administration can oversee the elections in a way that all political parties and actors regard as sufficiently inclusive and legitimate.

2. What Has Been Achieved: Formal and Institutional Preparations

Since the signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018, South Sudan has made little progress toward holding elections. The NEC was only reconstituted in 2024 and has since re-established State High Election Committees, developed policies and procedures, expanded engagement with political parties, civil society, the media and prospective observers, and trained more than 600 South Sudanese in election administration, half of them from civil society organizations.¹⁷ This administrative architecture is needed to manage the electoral process.

The NEC has a significant mandate under the legal framework. The National Elections Act, amended in 2023, gives the NEC responsibility for setting election dates, voter registration, nomination of candidates, recruitment and training of election staff, civic education for voters, and electoral dispute resolution. The law requires NEC, without prejudice and discrimination, to create a conducive atmosphere where citizens can exercise their political rights and express their will through a secret ballot.¹⁸

The NEC has stepped up preparations by publishing 102 geographical constituencies for the National Legislative Assembly, using the 2010 electoral geography after the state opted to proceed with the elections without conducting a census, as envisioned by the 2018 R-ARCSS.¹⁹ The NEC has also adopted regulations to guide electoral campaign procedures, including those involving the media, observers, and party events. The NEC has also developed civic education materials for circulation, and in July 2026 launched a nationwide voter education campaign.²⁰ These are tangible steps that demonstrate that the country is approaching the December 2026 general elections with some semblance of electoral institutions.

The September amendments to the electoral framework removed some of the legal obstacles that could have prevented the elections from proceeding as planned. But concerns remain about whether these amendments will add value, given that only three months remain until the general elections.

The major challenge with the electoral preparations is that the NEC activities have not yet translated into uniform operational readiness across the country. A CSO I spoke to stated that:

“The time is short and people don’t have enough time to prepare. There is no assurance about security during the elections, and civic education is limited because of the shrinking space for civil society.”

This is supported by independent analysis by PeaceRep and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, which describes administrative preparedness as uneven across the country.²¹ The analysis also highlighted that legal ambiguity, elite fragmentation, and shrinking civil space continue to shape the electoral environment. The NEC’s independent consultations have also identified constraints such as funding, legal clarity, and electoral security as affecting the operating environment.²²

Public uncertainty remains, especially on the census and voter registration, particularly in states with active conflict. A CSO lamented that “Elections are happening without conducting a census, so it is hard to know the number of voters”. Voter registration will determine who is eligible to vote, but the absence of a new census complicates demographic and constituency questions. The September amendments have now settled the legal question of whether the election can proceed without a new census, but they do not resolve the practical challenge identified by the CSOs I spoke to: “establishing a credible and inclusive voter register after years of displacement and demographic change”. The immediate challenge for the NEC is whether it can complete a credible voter registration across all states, conduct civic education that clearly explains the rules, and finance the operation in a transparent and predictable way.

The dissolution of the transitional government and the establishment of a caretaker administration have added another institutional test for the NEC. The test for the NEC is whether political parties and citizens consider it independent of the executive at a time when national and state legislatures are non-existent.

3. The Political Conditions: Can the Election Be Genuinely Competitive?

Many CSOs and policy actors continue to question the election’s competitiveness. The December 2026 elections will acquire legitimacy when political actors have a meaningful opportunity to contest, and citizens believe they have exercised their political rights through the ballot.

The arrest, detention, suspension, and ongoing trial of Riek Machar is at the center of this political uncertainty.²³ Former First Vice-President Riek Machar is accused of involvement in the March 2025 violence in Nasir.²⁴ This brief does not seek to determine whether Machar is guilty or innocent, but rather examines the political significance of his arrest and detention. Machar remains the chair of SPLM-IO and is a principal signatory to the peace agreement that established the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity that was dissolved on 22 September 2026.²⁵

Before the transitional government’s dissolution, the detention of Machar and the removal of several SPLM-IO representatives had already weakened the fragile responsibility-sharing agreement. RJMEC reported in May 2026 that SPLM-IO said it had not been consulted on the proposed amendments and that many of its representatives had been removed from their positions.²⁶ The current dissolution has further eroded power-sharing.²⁷ This has significantly changed the political context of the elections. The elections are no longer being prepared under a transitional government but under a caretaker administration which is headed by the incumbent president. This now raises questions about political neutrality, equal access to state institutions, and freedom to campaign.

Significant uncertainty remains over whether political parties will be able to participate and compete on equal terms in the general elections. A CSO I spoke to stated that “As for now, there’s no clarity on how the political parties will participate in the elections fairly. Justice is still a problem as a number of politicians are still in detention”. Political party registration is just one measure of competitiveness, as meaningful competition will be achieved when candidates are nominated, political parties are organized throughout the country, supporters are free to assemble without fear of attacks, electoral observers perform their role without coercion, and opposition actors have equal opportunity to also win the elections. The National Elections Act gives citizens the right to nominate but also to be nominated, but the political situation in the country needs to make these rights usable by the people on the ground.²⁸

The establishment of a caretaker administration has already generated concerns from other political actors about consultations and opportunities to campaign peacefully. For example, presidential aspirant Kornelio Kon Ngu has criticized the caretaker appointments, arguing that other political parties had not been consulted as previously expected.²⁹

CSOs have also highlighted that:

“Freedom to contest, campaign and have their members involved in the electoral process as witnesses. Political actors must return to dialogue because there are a number of existing differences between them.”

“There are no campaigns except the current President is traveling and campaigning. There are no other candidates doing campaigns. It is not certain if other candidates are allowed to enter the race.”

The second observation above should not be treated as proof that opposition parties have been prohibited from entering the race and campaigning. Rather, it captures uncertainty about whether political competition will be meaningful before the December 2026 vote. The transition to a caretaker administration makes this concern more urgent because an electoral process can comply with formal rules but still struggle with legitimacy if citizens do not see credible alternatives.

With President Salva Kiir remaining in office and leading the caretaker administration, questions about a level playing field have become more important. This is in line with the EU’s immediate response to the caretaker arrangement, which cautioned against the excessive use of executive power at a time when checks and balances are weak.³⁰

Machar’s detention has magnified the competitiveness problem, as one CSO described his prosecution as a “political witch-hunt” and feared that post-election violence might be witnessed in many parts of the country if Machar remained detained or was excluded from participating in the upcoming general elections. Many South Sudanese also see his detention as a provocation. These are all perceptions and should not be interpreted as findings about the merits of the ongoing case against him. But in contexts like South Sudan, perception matters when electoral legitimacy depends on citizens believing the electoral process is open to all.

The questions about political competitiveness go beyond Machar. As a CSO noted to me, “There is a new idea that there should be only one SPLM. Some people see that as a way to kick the SPLM-IO out of the process”. Given that the future of South Sudan is bigger than the political rivalry between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, it is imperative to examine whether the political constituencies represented by SPLM-IO and other opposition parties believe they can compete peacefully in the process. If major actors believe the electoral process is not inclusive and fair enough to allow them to pursue power, the elections will not serve their intended purpose, which is to move South Sudan from a negotiated power-sharing agreement toward legitimate democratic competition.

4. Security Conditions: Can Citizens Participate Safely?

The credibility of the December 2026 elections will go beyond Juba as citizens across the country must be able to register, campaign, attend political meetings, and vote without fear of political violence. Current evidence of insecurity across many parts of the country shows this will not be a uniform process.

In the first quarter of 2026, RJMEC recorded 133 violations of the permanent ceasefire, which included armed clashes, attacks against civilians, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), forced displacement, and occupation of civilian areas by armed actors. Jonglei State was reported to be the most affected.³¹

The impact of this insecurity on civilians has been substantial. Between January and March 2026, UNMISS documented 206 incidents affecting 1,388 civilians (767 killed, 457 injured, 93 abducted, 71 SGBV).³² UN Human Rights has also raised concerns about widespread displacement and attacks against unarmed civilians in Jonglei, Lakes, Upper Nile and Central Equatoria.³³ CSOs are now calling for security sector reforms to strengthen the country’s security beyond the election. A CSO noted that “There should be security reform. By this I mean the security sector should be for South Sudan, not aligned to any political party or ethnicity.” This is not just a security sector question, as it is also an electoral question. The NEC has identified the National Police Service as having the sole responsibility for protecting voters, polling stations, and all electoral officials and materials. Yet the neutrality of the police cannot be assumed because they have been assigned an electoral role. Political parties and their constituencies need assurances and confidence that these institutions will act fairly and transparently and remain neutral.³⁴

The dissolution of the transitional government has increased the urgency for clear command arrangements, transparency for the electoral process, and accountability for the forces responsible for electoral security. Political parties and citizens need confidence that the same security protections will apply to both the government and opposition during campaigns, voter registration, polling stations, and post-election disputes that may arise.

At the moment, the absence of security guarantees may discourage some citizens from traveling to their local areas to register or vote, particularly in conflict-affected communities. A CSO stated that “There is no assurance about security during the elections. Many people are planning to leave the country because they are afraid of what will happen. Because of insecurity in the villages, many people are not willing to travel to go and vote”. These fears are also reflected in wider public opinion. A 2025 PeaceRep/FES survey of 4,582 respondents found strong support for organizing the election, but around two-thirds of the respondents feared electoral violence and almost half feared that the elections could return the country to civil war.³⁵

South Sudanese are not only questioning whether the elections can be held; many do not believe they will be safe. Insecurity will shape the electorate before any ballot is cast. Those who have been displaced may be reluctant or unable to travel, and those who are living in areas with active conflict may have fewer opportunities to register and vote. Under the current circumstances, the December 2026 general elections risk producing highly unequal participation opportunities.

5. Civic Space, Public Trust and Inclusion

Security alone will not be a determinant of meaningful participation in the December elections. Elections require an environment where constituents can listen to a variety of ideas, question leaders, access reliable information, and make informed decisions based on their information. South Sudan’s legal framework recognizes freedom of association, assembly and access to information for all citizens; the challenge has been the enforcement of the law in reality.³⁶

In July 2026, NEC launched a nationwide voter education campaign. CSOs have also been involved in electoral consultations and trainings.³⁷ These are important measures especially for a country like South Sudan that has not had a national election since its independence.³⁸ A CSO shared that “Civic education is limited because of the shrinking space for civil society. Many communities are still confused about how the voting will work”. This is supported by a 2025 survey conducted by PeaceRep/FES, which found that civic space in South Sudan remains constrained and many respondents felt unsafe discussing the upcoming general elections, and respondents did not trust political actors.³⁹ UNMISS and CSOs have highlighted that expanded civic space is essential for meaningful citizen participation in the upcoming general elections.⁴⁰

There are also questions about inclusion. The NEC has stated that its civic education campaign is designed to reach women, youth, people with disabilities, IDPs, the elderly, and returnees. The electoral system also allows for a 35% women’s party list for the national assembly. However, formal inclusion rules do not solve the political and security barriers created by wide displacement and uneven access to credible information.⁴¹ A CSO commenting on the barriers noted that “There is still a question about the many refugees and IDPs who may not be able to vote”.

For refugees, IDPs and returnees, questions about how they will register, under which constituency, where they will vote and what security arrangements have been made to protect them will determine the credibility of the election. At the same time, there is a need to clarify electoral complaints procedures and the eligibility criteria for candidates as envisioned under the current law.

Under the current circumstances, it is important to differentiate Juba from the rest of the country. Information that is available to political elites in Juba, international organizations, and national CSOs cannot be assumed to be available to communities in insecure and remote areas. If many parts of the country remain insecure before the elections, citizens in these areas risk reaching election day without sufficient information about the electoral process, their choices, and how to exercise their rights. Citizens are being asked to understand the electoral process while the institutions that have held the country together since 2018 are changing. As such, clear public communication about the caretaker administration’s role will be essential to build confidence.

6. The Dilemma: Proceeding, Postponing or Renegotiating the Pathway?

South Sudan faces a more difficult choice than simply holding or postponing the general elections scheduled for December 2026. South Sudanese demand for elections is strong, but there is also widespread fear about electoral violence. At this stage, it is important to ask what political framework can support either decision to move the country towards a legitimate democratic process rather than another civil war.⁴²

The dissolution of the transitional government has further narrowed this dilemma as the country enters the final three months to the election under a caretaker administration, while many of the security concerns identified in this brief remain unresolved. The major question remains whether sufficient political safeguards are in place to make the elections legitimate and acceptable.

Scenario 1: A negotiated and sufficiently credible election

Given that the elections have been postponed twice already, the most constructive pathway for South Sudan at the moment is to retain the December date while urgently putting in place structures and negotiating minimum conditions to enable credible competition. This will entail an urgent electoral compact among the principal parties to the peace agreement, other political actors, and relevant civil society organizations, while also opening space for new political actors, protecting civic and political space, allocating adequate and predictable financing for the NEC, ensuring credible voter registration, and establishing impartial arrangements for electoral security.

The new inter-party dialogue launched on 24 September is an important opportunity to begin addressing some of these issues.⁴³ However, it will only become useful if political actors use the space to reach consensus on campaigns, participation, electoral security and dispute resolution mechanisms.⁴⁴ This will not require full completion of all R-ARCSS requirements before the election; it will require addressing the minimum political, legal, institutional and security requirements necessary for a free, credible and peaceful election.

Scenario 2: Elections proceed without sufficient political agreement

Following the dissolution of the transitional government, the second scenario has become more plausible. Elections could now proceed administratively under the caretaker arrangement while significant political disagreements remain unresolved. This would mean ballots are printed and elections are held, but some opposition constituencies, displaced populations, or conflict-affected communities participate only partially or question the legitimacy of the process. This could produce elected officials without addressing the legitimacy crisis they were meant to address.

If actors believe the process is unfair even before elections are held, disputes over the results could quickly move from electoral institutions back into political and military confrontation.

Scenario 3: Another extension without a binding reform framework

Another extension carries risks as the process has already been postponed twice because critical tasks were incomplete. Another delay without clear obligations would deepen frustration in a transition process that has lasted longer than planned. It can also reinforce an existing perception that the transition has become a system that is preserving power for the current president.

Should December become unviable, any extension should be public, time-bound, and linked to measurable benchmarks which can include political dialogue, voter registration, electoral financing, logistical and operational security, a guaranteed civic space, and clear arrangements for displaced people, refugees, and returnees. The extension should be subjected to monitoring and reporting by the same institutions that have already been mandated under the R-ARCSS.

The dissolution of the transitional government and the establishment of the caretaker administration further complicate any postponement. If the elections are delayed beyond December 2026, there will need to be clarity on the legal authority, duration, and accountability of the caretaker administration.

7. What Should Be Done Before December 2026?

With less than three months until the election, South Sudan cannot realistically meet all the outstanding provisions of the R-ARCSS before the election. The priority should be on the small number of provisions that are imperative to a free and fair electoral process.

For the President, Caretaker Administration and parties to the R-ARCSS

The government needs to resume an inclusive and time-bound political dialogue on the electoral process. The recently launched inter-party dialogue is the perfect platform to build minimum agreement on the conditions for credible participation. The dialogue should address the current political impasse with SPLM-IO, inclusion of eligible political parties in the electoral process, treatment of political detainees, and the conditions under which political parties will accept the electoral outcomes.

Any other amendments to the R-ARCSS or the electoral framework should be done through inclusive consultations and should follow Article 8.4 and be limited to provisions crucial to enabling a free, fair, and credible election.⁴⁵

The president and the caretaker administration should clarify the link between the new administration and the R-ARCSS, especially institutions like RJMEC and CTSAMVM that were established under the power-sharing agreement.

The government must guarantee political organization, assembly and campaigning in practice and not just in rhetoric and law. Electoral institutions deployed by NEC should act in fairness and remain neutral. The stalled security arrangements under the R-ARCSS should be immediately restored to prevent local conflicts from escalating along tribal and political lines.⁴⁶

The government needs to provide NEC with predictable and adequate funds to operate independently. The independence of the electoral process is weakened when the institution mandated to conduct elections faces inadequate, delayed, or unpredictable financing.

For the National Elections Commission

The NEC should keep the public informed by regularly publishing a realistic operational calendar that covers updates on voter registration, political parties, candidates, campaign periods, polling stations, and security arrangements. The NEC should also provide a public explanation when there are delays. It should also clearly explain to the public which offices will be elected and which institutions will be responsible for dispute resolution.⁴⁷

The NEC needs to treat issues of displacement and returnees with urgency. It needs to explain how displaced persons, returnees, and refugees will register and vote. Regular reporting on procurement, financing and the readiness of the State High Election Committees would help build confidence among the electorate that preparations are going well.

For the African Union and IGAD

The AU and IGAD should treat the South Sudan election as a peace and political transition process and not only as an electoral management event. The AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan (C5+) has reaffirmed the R-ARCSS as the foundation for lasting stability and called for sustained inclusive dialogue among the signatories.⁴⁸ IGAD has similarly emphasized dialogue, confidence-building and adherence to the Agreement as conditions for peaceful, credible, inclusive and transparent elections.⁴⁹

AU and IGAD now need to translate these positions into tangible engagements with the authorities that will result in electoral credibility. A coherent regional position is needed to reduce contradictory messaging, especially when all parties must make difficult political compromises.

For the United Nations, EU Delegation, and international partners

International partners have been critical in supporting South Sudan’s transition. This technical and financial support should continue, especially in civic education, election administration, security preparedness, independent media, and youth networks. These actors and structures will be critical in the December general elections.

UN Human Rights and other human rights organizations should continue to monitor and report the situation. These institutions must maintain public reporting on violence, restrictions, and access for political and civic actors across the whole country.⁵⁰

International actors should avoid legitimizing the elections simply because voting occurred, or supporting another extension without measurable reforms, accountability, and timelines.

International partners should also monitor the caretaker administration to ensure all political parties and actors have equal space to campaign and receive equal protection.

Conclusion: Elections Must End the Transition, Not the Peace

Despite the many challenges facing South Sudan as the country prepares for its first elections since independence, this is an opportunity that should not be underestimated. After many years of government through transitional arrangements, these elections provide an opportunity for the citizens to finally determine their political leadership through the ballot box. Repeated postponements have weakened public confidence in governance institutions, and this is an important opportunity to change that.

The dissolution of the transitional government has fundamentally changed the landscape for the upcoming general elections. The transitional government ended before many of the reforms were completed. The major concern now is whether the caretaker administration can oversee the elections in a way that political actors and citizens can regard as inclusive, impartial, and legitimate.

Given that an election date has been set, the country does not need to complete all the reforms promised under the 2018 peace agreement before the elections, nor does it need a perfect political and security environment before the elections can be conducted. Rather, efforts must ensure that all provisions that are necessary for a free and fair electoral process are implemented, and that there is sufficient political agreement around the rules governing the vote. The NEC must be supported with the resources it needs to conduct the elections, and the security institutions assigned to the electoral process must remain neutral throughout. The role of the R-ARCSS and its monitoring institutions must be clearly defined during the caretaker administration.

The success of the December 2026 general elections will not be measured by whether polling stations open or ballots are cast, but, most importantly, by what happens after the elections. If the electoral process gives citizens and political actors the confidence to access electoral results and have judicial means to address electoral disputes, then the elections will provide a credible route out of the prolonged transition. If not, then the country will end the transition calendar without completing the transition. The elections meant to consolidate peace will instead become a source of political instability.

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References

¹ RJMEC. Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), 2018. https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/arcss-2015/igad-hlrf-agreement/108-revitalised-agreement-on-the-resolution-of-the-conflict-in-the-republic-of-south-sudan-r-arcss-2018

² National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Frequently Asked Questions: mandate, legal framework, election date and institutional preparations. https://nec.gov.ss/frequently-asked-questions/

³ RJMEC. Briefing on the First Quarterly Report of 2026 to the RTNLA, 20 May 2026. https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/jmec-statements/item/825-briefing-on-the-rjmec-first-quarterly-report-of-2026-1st-january-to-31st-march-2026-by-h-e-amb-maj-gen-aggrey-george-owinow-rtd-interim-chairperson-rjmec-to-the-rtnla-delivered-on-20th-may-2026-juba-south-sudan

⁴ Muorwel, James Kunhiak and Jan Pospisil. Now or Never? Political Conditions for Credible Elections in South Sudan. PeaceRep/Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2026. https://peacerep.org/publication/now-or-never-political-conditions-for-credible-elections-in-south-sudan/

⁵ Radio Tamazuj. Kiir dissolves government, appoints caretaker administration, 22 September 2026. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/kiir-dissolves-government-appoints-caretaker-administration

⁶ Reuters. South Sudan's Kiir dissolves government, clears hurdles to delayed election, 22 September 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-sudans-president-signs-election-law-changes-ahead-december-vote-2026-09-22/

⁷ RJMEC. Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), 2018. https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/arcss-2015/igad-hlrf-agreement/108-revitalised-agreement-on-the-resolution-of-the-conflict-in-the-republic-of-south-sudan-r-arcss-2018

⁸ RJMEC. Reporting on the 2022 Roadmap and extension of the transitional period. https://www.jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/jmec-statements/item/652-statement-by-h-e-amb-maj-gen-rtd-charles-tai-gituai-cbs-interim-chairperson-rjmec-to-the-25th-rjmec-monthly-meeting-thursday-15-december-2022-juba-south-sudan

⁹ RJMEC. Reporting on the September 2024 extension of the transition to February 2027 and elections to December 2026. https://www.jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/jmec-statements

¹⁰ Article 8.2 establishes that the peace agreement holds legal precedence over the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (2011) and all conflicting national legislation. This clause ensures the supremacy of the agreement by neutralizing contradictory domestic laws.

¹¹ RJMEC. Briefing on the First Quarterly Report of 2026 to the RTNLA, 20 May 2026. https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/jmec-statements/item/825-briefing-on-the-rjmec-first-quarterly-report-of-2026-1st-january-to-31st-march-2026-by-h-e-amb-maj-gen-aggrey-george-owinow-rtd-interim-chairperson-rjmec-to-the-rtnla-delivered-on-20th-may-2026-juba-south-sudan

¹² Reuters. South Sudan's Kiir dissolves government, clears hurdles to delayed election, 22 September 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-sudans-president-signs-election-law-changes-ahead-december-vote-2026-09-22/

¹³ IGAD. Communiqué of the 74th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, 15 September 2026. https://igad.int/communique-of-the-74th-extraordinary-session-of-the-igad-council-of-ministers/

¹⁴ RJMEC. Briefing on the First Quarterly Report of 2026 to the RTNLA, 20 May 2026. https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/jmec-statements/item/825-briefing-on-the-rjmec-first-quarterly-report-of-2026-1st-january-to-31st-march-2026-by-h-e-amb-maj-gen-aggrey-george-owinow-rtd-interim-chairperson-rjmec-to-the-rtnla-delivered-on-20th-may-2026-juba-south-sudan

¹⁵ RJMEC. Briefing on the First Quarterly Report of 2026 to the RTNLA, 20 May 2026. https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/jmec-statements/item/825-briefing-on-the-rjmec-first-quarterly-report-of-2026-1st-january-to-31st-march-2026-by-h-e-amb-maj-gen-aggrey-george-owinow-rtd-interim-chairperson-rjmec-to-the-rtnla-delivered-on-20th-may-2026-juba-south-sudan

¹⁶ UN Human Rights Council. Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, A/HRC/61/25, 11 March 2026. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/61/25

¹⁷ National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Frequently Asked Questions: mandate, legal framework, election date and institutional preparations. https://nec.gov.ss/frequently-asked-questions/

¹⁸ National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Frequently Asked Questions: mandate, legal framework, election date and institutional preparations. https://nec.gov.ss/frequently-asked-questions/

¹⁹ National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Constitution and geographical constituency resources. https://nec.gov.ss/download-category/constitution/

²⁰ National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Electoral stakeholder consultation on regulations, civic education, timeline, legal clarity, funding and election security. https://nec.gov.ss/national-elections-commission-engages-electoral-stakeholders-in-consultative-meeting-to-advance-electoral-process/

²¹ Muorwel, James Kunhiak and Jan Pospisil. Now or Never? Political Conditions for Credible Elections in South Sudan. PeaceRep/Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2026. https://peacerep.org/publication/now-or-never-political-conditions-for-credible-elections-in-south-sudan/

²² National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Electoral stakeholder consultation on regulations, civic education, timeline, legal clarity, funding and election security. https://nec.gov.ss/national-elections-commission-engages-electoral-stakeholders-in-consultative-meeting-to-advance-electoral-process/

²³ UN Human Rights Council. Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, A/HRC/61/25, 11 March 2026. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/61/25

²⁴ Machar defence battles prosecution over how accused will testify. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/machar-defence-battles-prosecution-over-how-accused-will-testify

²⁵ Recent reporting on the continuing Machar trial and house arrest, including court proceedings in July-August 2026. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/machar-trial-adjourned-after-judge-falls-ill-2

²⁶ RJMEC. Briefing on the First Quarterly Report of 2026 to the RTNLA, 20 May 2026. https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/jmec-statements/item/825-briefing-on-the-rjmec-first-quarterly-report-of-2026-1st-january-to-31st-march-2026-by-h-e-amb-maj-gen-aggrey-george-owinow-rtd-interim-chairperson-rjmec-to-the-rtnla-delivered-on-20th-may-2026-juba-south-sudan

²⁷ Radio Tamazuj. Kiir dissolves government, appoints caretaker administration, 22 September 2026.

²⁸ National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Frequently Asked Questions: mandate, legal framework, election date and institutional preparations. https://nec.gov.ss/frequently-asked-questions/

²⁹ Radio Tamazuj. Kon rejects Kiir’s caretaker appointments, calls for consultation, 23 September 2026.

³⁰ Radio Tamazuj. EU warns caretaker government against overreach, 22 September 2026.

³¹ RJMEC. Briefing on the First Quarterly Report of 2026 to the RTNLA, 20 May 2026. https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/jmec-statements/item/825-briefing-on-the-rjmec-first-quarterly-report-of-2026-1st-january-to-31st-march-2026-by-h-e-amb-maj-gen-aggrey-george-owinow-rtd-interim-chairperson-rjmec-to-the-rtnla-delivered-on-20th-may-2026-juba-south-sudan

³² UNMISS. Sharp rise in civilian deaths recorded in UNMISS report, 30 June 2026. https://unmiss.unmissions.org/en/press-releases/press-release-sharp-rise-in-civilian-deaths-recorded-in-unmiss-report

³³ OHCHR Special Procedures. Joint communication SSD 1/2026 concerning large-scale displacement and alleged violations in Jonglei, Lakes, Upper Nile and Central Equatoria. https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TmSearch/Mandates?m=272

³⁴ National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Frequently Asked Questions: mandate, legal framework, election date and institutional preparations. https://nec.gov.ss/frequently-asked-questions/

³⁵ Deng, David; Sophia Dawkins; Christopher Oringa; and Jan Pospisil. Trends in Civic Space and Elections in South Sudan: Findings from the 2025 Public Perceptions of Peace Survey. PeaceRep/FES, 2025. https://peacerep.org/publication/trends-in-civic-space-and-elections-in-south-sudan/

³⁶ National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Frequently Asked Questions: mandate, legal framework, election date and institutional preparations. https://nec.gov.ss/frequently-asked-questions/

³⁷ National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Frequently Asked Questions: mandate, legal framework, election date and institutional preparations. https://nec.gov.ss/frequently-asked-questions/

³⁸ National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Civic and voter education resources and 2026 campaign materials. https://nec.gov.ss/

³⁹ Deng, David; Sophia Dawkins; Christopher Oringa; and Jan Pospisil. Trends in Civic Space and Elections in South Sudan: Findings from the 2025 Public Perceptions of Peace Survey. PeaceRep/FES, 2025. https://peacerep.org/publication/trends-in-civic-space-and-elections-in-south-sudan/

⁴⁰ UNMISS. Civil society, faith-based groups and parliamentarians push for expanded civic space, 2026. https://unmiss.unmissions.org/en/news/civil-society-faith-based-groups-and-parliamentarians-push-for-expanded-civic-space

⁴¹ National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Frequently Asked Questions: mandate, legal framework, election date and institutional preparations. https://nec.gov.ss/frequently-asked-questions/

⁴² Deng, David; Sophia Dawkins; Christopher Oringa; and Jan Pospisil. Trends in Civic Space and Elections in South Sudan: Findings from the 2025 Public Perceptions of Peace Survey. PeaceRep/FES, 2025. https://peacerep.org/publication/trends-in-civic-space-and-elections-in-south-sudan/

⁴³ Reuters. South Sudan launch of the Inter-Party Political Dialogue in Juba. https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/south-sudan-launch-of-the-inter-party-political-dialogue-in-juba/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjY6bmV3c21sX1JDMk1QTkFTNFlRNQ

⁴⁴ IGAD. Communiqué of the 74th Extraordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, 15 September 2026.

⁴⁵ RJMEC. Briefing on the First Quarterly Report of 2026 to the RTNLA, 20 May 2026. https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/jmec-statements/item/825-briefing-on-the-rjmec-first-quarterly-report-of-2026-1st-january-to-31st-march-2026-by-h-e-amb-maj-gen-aggrey-george-owinow-rtd-interim-chairperson-rjmec-to-the-rtnla-delivered-on-20th-may-2026-juba-south-sudan

⁴⁶ RJMEC. Briefing on the First Quarterly Report of 2026 to the RTNLA, 20 May 2026. https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/jmec-statements/item/825-briefing-on-the-rjmec-first-quarterly-report-of-2026-1st-january-to-31st-march-2026-by-h-e-amb-maj-gen-aggrey-george-owinow-rtd-interim-chairperson-rjmec-to-the-rtnla-delivered-on-20th-may-2026-juba-south-sudan

⁴⁷ National Elections Commission of South Sudan. Frequently Asked Questions: mandate, legal framework, election date and institutional preparations. https://nec.gov.ss/frequently-asked-questions/

⁴⁸ African Union. AUC Chairperson engagement with the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee on South Sudan (C5+), 16 February 2026. https://static.au.int/sw/node/46010

⁴⁹ IGAD. Reaffirms support for South Sudan’s peace process, democratic transition and election preparations, 17 June 2026. https://igad.int/igad-reaffirms-support-for-south-sudans-peace-process-democratic-transition-and-election-preparations-during-high-level-meeting-with-president-salva-kiir/

⁵⁰ UN Human Rights Council. Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, A/HRC/61/25, 11 March 2026. https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/61/25

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GGI Briefing 5/2026

Acho Gerald Anji is a GGI Peace and Security Fellow. He currently serves as Sudan Country Manager at Concordis International, and as a PhD researcher at Leiden University in the Netherlands. He brings more than a decade of experience in peacebuilding, security, and development across the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions, with a strong focus on the Humanitarian–Development–Peace nexus.